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Introduction

There has been a long history in Christianity on the study of the relationship
between theology and science. For example, the Greek Fathers "pursued scientific
knowledge for its theological and moral use." 1 Even Augustine, who had an "ambivalent
attitude toward science," used natural science to oppose astrology, grounding his argument
"by reference to observable reality." 2 In recent years, there have been efforts to relate
theology and science in various ways. 3 One of the on-going scientific discussions is the
question of how something can arise and develop into something else in the universe.
Among the theories that address this question is the scientific perspective of 'emergence',
which was developed within an evolutionary understanding of the world. The scientific
perspective of emergence is a framework to help one understand how matter is not only
able to emerge but also develop into something essentially higher. One theologian whose
theology developed within an evolutionary perspective was Karl Rahner, a prominent
German Catholic Jesuit theologian (1904-1984 ). Rahner weaved evolutionary biology into
his theology as a way to relate theology with the discoveries of science. In his work, Rahner
explained how matter continues to develop even after the universe emerged. The
development of matter in a state of 'becoming' is possible because of 'active selftranscendence'.

1

Peter M . J. Hess and Paul L. Allen, Catholicism and Science (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,

2

Ibid., 9-11.

2008), 8.

3
For example, we see this effort from the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences (CTNS),
which is a graduate program of the Graduate Theological Union {GTU) in Berkeley, California. See
http://www.ctns.org. The Catholic Church also engages theology and science, such as its work in the Vatican
Observatory. See http://www.vaticanobservatory. va/content/specolavaticana/en.html.

In this thesis, I will argue that the current scientific perspective of 'emergence' can
give a more robust understanding to Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence. 4 I will
demonstrate this by showing that Rahner's concept of active self-transcendence is
congruent to that of the of emergence. For example, both positions agree in the unity of all
things and that there is a hierarchical level of complexity in the universe. In this respect,
the scientific perspective of emergence strengthens and broadens Rahner's argument.
Among the strengths of emergence, is that this framework can integrate patterns across
levels of emergence and across a variety of scientific theories.
This thesis will make its argument in three chapters. The first chapter will begin by
exploring the main themes of Rahner's thought to better appreciate the context in which
Rahner paints the development of matter to spirit before expounding on the notion of active
self-transcendence. The goal of the first chapter will be to explain that active selftranscendence speaks of 'matter' in a process of 'becoming' (and becoming something
more), leaping to something essentially higher, and that this process of 'becoming' is made
possible through the dynamism of the absolute being. By integrating the perspective of
evolutionary biology, Rahner gives us a notion which paints a trajectory of development
from the beginning of creation to the emergence of life.
Emergence cannot be defined in simple terms. The second chapter will develop its
argument in three parts: A, B, and C. Part A will begin by showing that emergence is often

4

The notion of active self-transcendence can be found in many of Karl Rahner's writings. They
include the following: Karl Rahner, "Christology Within an Evolutionary View of the World," in Theological
Investigations, vol. 5, Later Writings, trans. by Karl-H. Kruger {London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966);
"Christology in the Setting of Modem Man's Understanding of Himself and of His World," in Theological
Investigations, vol. 11, Confrontations, trans. by David Bourke {London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1974 );
and Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity (New York: Crossroad,
1984), 176-311.

2

identified with the concept of 'complexity'. Next, the perspective of emergence rose within
the context of reductionism and understanding it will help shed a greater understanding on
emergence. I will also discuss concepts such as epistemological (weak) and ontological
(strong) emergence, including their meanings and characteristics. They are important to the
discussion of this thesis. Part B will discuss how the perspective of emergence can show
the development of human beings to something essentially higher from an evolutionary
perspective. Using the characteristics of emergence, I will demonstrate how we can speak
of the human person possessing a sense of openness today. Finally, in part C, I shall offer
a working definition to the scientific perspective of emergence, including some
clarifications.
The last chapter of this thesis will synthesize Rahner's core ideas about the notion
of active self-transcendence with the concepts, meanings, and characteristics of emergence
as was described in the second chapter. The goal is to show how the concepts, meanings,
and characteristics of emergence can strengthen Rahner' s argument on how matter can
actively self-transcend to something essentially higher. Finally, I will also consider how
the discussion in this thesis can be relevant for the understanding of Christian faith today
and our place in the world. By the end of this thesis, I hope to have sufficiently
demonstrated how the scientific perspective of emergence adds robustness to Rahner's
notion of active self-transcendence, thereby making a positive contribution to the current
efforts of elucidating the relationship between theology and science.
This thesis also falls within a wider context, which is on the relationship between
theology and science. As such, some consideration of the relationship between the two
discipline before we delve into the thesis might be helpful.

3

1. Faith Intelligible with the Realities of Life

Recently, a friend shared that a priest spoke about the soul. According to this priest,
the soul remains on earth for forty days before ascending to heaven. When I inquired
further, I learned that a lecturer had taught this at the seminary. I also remember a bishop
who stated very confidently that evil spirits reside in temples, and this belief is also held
by many Catholics in Asia.
The example above 1s among the reasons why it is important to stress the
relationship between theology and science. A simple fact is that science is important to life
today. The practical application of science has shaped human life in ways that are profound,
from mobile devices to medical advances. The discoveries of science make the universe
comprehensible to us. Most of us do not think of science as a kind ofreligion; instead, it is
a way for us to understand the nature of things through empirical means. Scientists develop
theories to interpret the discoveries of science. For example, the discovery of radioactive
waves as cosmic background noise is one of the data that enabled scientists to construct
the Big Bang model, which tells us how the universe began. Scientific discoveries
contribute to our progress as a species and to our species' understanding of itself.
In their book The Grand Design, scientists Stephen Hawking and Leonard
Mlodinow point out that people in the past turned to God because they did not know better.
They assert that that is not the case today because science has made God irrelevant. They
state that "ignorance of nature's ways led people in ancient times to invent gods to lord
over every aspect of human life." 5 This view echoes what Ian Barbour claims about certain

5

Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design (New York: Bantam Books, 2012),

25.

4

perspectives on religious beliefs. Barbour points out that people often have contrasting
views of science and religion. Science is viewed as "objective, universal, rational, and
based on solid observational evidence," while religion "seems to be subjective, parochial,
emotional, and based on traditions or authorities that disagree with each other."6 Barbour
also described four ways that science can relate to religion. They are Conflict,
Independence, Dialogue, and Integration.7
One can hardly blame the bleak view that many people, such as Hawking and
Mlodinow, have about religion. Religion is slow to enter into dialogue or seek some form
of integration with other viewpoints. When it comes to religion, many seem to be in a place
of conflict and independence. Our practice of religion can and must be better. Or else,
Barbour' s bleak description of Christianity may prove to be correct.
Working towards establishing a relationship between theology and science is a first
step. Science is essential to our faith because the absence of a correct scientific perspective
can leave a gap in our theology. This gap can result in a faith that is at risk of becoming
parochial and out of touch with reality, or it can even give rise to superstition as we saw in
the example at the beginning of this section.
There has also been an ongoing discussion on the relationship between theology
and science in the Catholic Church. Pope Francis himself integrated science into his

6

Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues, rev. ed (San Francisco:
HarperSanFrancisco, 1997), 77. Barbour explains why this view is not valid in his book, but I will not delve
into it in this thesis but just state that such a view of religion still exists today.
7

Ibid.

5

encyclical Laudato Si'. In it, he speaks of "complex systems" and "biological evolution." 8
Francis's encyclical shows that science can ground the way in which we can understand
ourselves and our place in the universe. Science can also give us a more "concrete language
for our deepest insights about God's relation to creation." 9
St. Anselm tells us that theology is faith seeking understanding. Theology is a way
for us to elaborate and make clear the contents of our faith. It makes sense, then, why
Francis Schussler Fiorenza writes that "theology is a fragile discipline," which is "more a
hope than a science." 10 Theology "is more like a raft bobbing on the waves of the sea than
a pyramid built on solid ground. " 11 From my perspective, establishing a relationship
between theology and science makes theology less like a raft bobbing on the waves of the
sea. This relationship will allow one to speak of a divine action in a way that is grounded
and real. Thomas Tracy tells us that "any divine action that affects historical events,
therefore must take the form of an intervention that disrupts the intelligible structures of
the world around us and threatens the coherence and integrity of our lives." 12
Having considered how science can enrich our own understanding of faith, this
thesis now will delve into the work of Rahner, whose theology is also enriched by the
discoveries of science.
8
Francis, Laudato Si': On the Care for Our Common Home, May 24, 2015, Chapter 1, #18 , accessed
September
9,
2016,
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papafrancesco - 20150524 - enciclica-laudato-si.html.
9
Robert John Russell, Cosmology, from Alpha to Omega: The Creative Mutual Interaction of
Theology and Science (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), 52.

°

1

Francis Schussler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin, Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic
Perspectives, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2011), 3.
II

Ibid.

12

Thomas F. Tracy, ed., The God Who Acts: Philosophical and Theological Explorations,
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 78.
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Chapter 1
The Notion of Active Self-Transcendence

In this chapter, I will outline Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence. The
heart of Rahner's argument is that matter increases in complexity through a process of
becoming, leaping to something essentially higher. This is made possible by the dynamic
creative power of the absolute being, which is immanently present in creation. Before
delving into Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence, this thesis will consider Rahner's
own disposition with science. Then, this thesis will discuss some of his pertinent
theological themes. It is important to understand Rahner's anthropology because he speaks
of the human person transcending into the mystery of God, which is made possible through
active self-transcendence. The notion of active self-transcendence exposes Rahner's efforts
in integrating an evolutionary perspective into an overarching metaphysics that describes
how God acts in creation. The goal of this chapter will be to grasp the notion of active selftranscendence.

1. Karl Rabner and Science
Rahner understood the need for the relationship between theology and science. He
belonged to the Catholic G6rresgesellschaft for the Advancement of Science, which was
established in 1957, five years before the opening of the Second Vatican Council. Rahner
also took "an active part in the annual conferences (often in Feldafing in Bavaria), and
there presented his view on questions of hominization, genetic engineering, and so on;

7

these were also published later." 13 Rahner saw science as a way to understand "how God's
creative presence is working itself out in history." 14 He was described as a "pastoral
theologian of the Church, very conscious of the particular context of German Catholicism
in the early twentieth century." 15 He was said to see "himself as a theologian of a Church
trying to locate itself and find a voice in the new world, especially a new Germany." 16
In "Christo logy within an Evolutionary View of the World," Rahner writes that it
is inevitable that a believer will wonder whether the understanding of "evolution of the
world can be justified before the Christian faith." 17 In addition, Rahner thinks that a
believer is bound to ask a second legitimate question about whether "his faith is compatible
and at least sufficiently reconcilable with the lifestyle and the horizons of understanding
which he shares with his age and with his contemporaries." 18 For Rahner, the human person
is something special, and thus he sees that "the persistent problem theology has with
evolutionary thinking is that the latter seems to diminish human uniqueness, resulting in
the view that the human being is simply a highly complex animal." 19

13

Herbert Vorgrimler, Understanding Karl Rahner: An Introduction to His Life and Thought (New
York: Crossroad, 1986), 73.
14

Michael Barnes, "Demythologization in the Theology of Karl Rabner," Theological Studies 55,
no. I (1994): 28 .
15

George E. Griener, "Karl Rabner: Pastoral Theologian," in Finding God in All Things:
Celebrating Bernard Lonergan, John Courtney Murray, and Karl Rahner, ed. Mark Bosco and David
Stagaman (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 151.
16

Ibid., 151.

17

Rabner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 178.

18

Ibid.

19

Gregory Brett, The Theological Notion of the Human Person: A Conversation Between the
Theology of Karl Rahner and the Philosophy ofJohn Macmurray (New York: Peter Lang, 2013) , 263.

8

In Foundations of Christian Faith , Rabner states that he wants to "give people
confidence for the very content of Christian dogma itself that they can believe with
intellectual honesty." 20 Intellectual honesty "does not compel one to believe, but it does
make it justifiable for one to do so."21 To be intellectually honest is to accept that one' s
faith is, "humanly speaking, always open and provisional, and capable of further
development." 22 It is in this sense that "faith itself. ..actively explores its own
content.. .[and] activates the critical and speculative faculties of the believer, causing him
to put the vital question of what his conscience demands of him in terms of truthfulness to
himself." 23 Quoting I Peter 3:15, Rabner tells us that we "want to reflect here upon this
fact of our Christian existence, and we want to justify it before the demands of conscience
and of truth by giving an 'account of our hope. '" 24
There are two ways to describe Rabner's work on the relationship between science
and theology. First, he is "forging links of meaning," as described by Philip Hefuer, who
explains, "If we engage science from a stance within religious experience, we will seek
above all to forge links of meaning between the world that science describes and that which
is most important to us." Hefner also states that "forging links that relate our lives to the
world around us is equivalent to establishing meaningfulness between ourselves and the

20

Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 12.

21

Karl Rahner, "Intellectual Honesty and the Christian Faith," in Th eological Investigations, vol. 7,
Furth er Th eology of Spiritual Life I , trans. David Bourke (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1971), 71 .
22

Ibid., 57 .

23

Ibid. , 58.

24

Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 2.

9

world." 25 Hefner tell us how meaning is established when speaking about forging meaning
and the process of discernment. He says that "meaning is established, for example, if a
person can take into account one or more natural processes - say, the evolution of life on
planet Earth or big bang cosmology - and come to the conclusion either that those
processes are supportive of her or his deepest values or that they are hostile to those
values." 26 The similarity in position is on the "methodological point of departure" when
engaging questions of evolution and theology, where Rahner states that "we are going to
try to forge a link between theology and the basic concepts of an evolutionary 'world view,'
as daring as this may sound."27
The second description relates to Rahner's view of intellectual honesty and
truthfulness. Michael Welker sees that the people who engage in discourses on science and
theology can be seen as "truth-seeking communities," and in this way, they fight against
"bad reductionism." 28 Truth-seeking communities are groups of courageous people "who
indeed raise truth claims, but above all develop and practice open and public forms and
procedures in which these truth claims are subjected to critical and self-critical
examination. " 29

25
Philip Hefner, "Religion and Science," in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed.
Philip Clayton and Zachary R. Simpson (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 563 .
26

Ibid.

27

Karl Rahner, "Natural Science and Reasonable Faith," in Theological Investigations, vol. 21,
Science and Christian Faith, trans. Hugh M. Riley (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1988), 34.
28

Michael Welker, "Science and Theology: Their Relation at the Beginning of the Third
Millennium," in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary R. Simpson
(Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 551-561.
29

Ibid., 557.

10

Herbert Vorgrimler states that in his dialogue with natural scientists, Rabner
learned "from them to think m a rationally limited way in evolutionary terms." 30
Vorgrimler goes on to say,
He learned to understand the history of God with the world and humanity as an
evolutionary process which moves forward in qualitative 'leaps': from the
inorganic to life, from the vegetative to consciousness, from the animal kingdom to
the human world, from parents to the child, from humanity to God in man, in Jesus
of Nazareth, from death to consummation. He termed these 'leaps' or transitions
self-transcendence, and in so doing preserved the honour of humanity, including
the honour of natural sciences, and the honour of God: God alone can enable the
finite to bring forth something really new. 31

2. Transcendence and the Self-Communication of God

The human person is wrapped in the absolutely incomprehensible mystery whom
we call God. Harvey D. Egan writes that "theology, for Rabner, must always be salvific,
that is, focused on God's forgiving, healing, and transforming love as revealed in the long
history of salvation which reached its high point in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus
Christ."32 Hence, Rabner views Christianity as simply "nothing more than the genuine
explication and true interpretation of what resides in the ultimate depth of the human
person." 33 In essence, "because Christianity is the best interpretation of what and who we
are, Rabner grounded his theology in God's unending self-revelation in human experience
manifested in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ." 34 Thus, for Rabner, the

30

Vorgrimler, Understanding Karl Rahner, 111.

31

Ibid., 112.

32

Harvey D. Egan, "Theology and Spirituality," in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner, ed.
Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines (2005; repr. , New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 14.
33

Ibid.

34

lbid.
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ground of the finiteness that human beings experience is the very ground by which they
transcend. Karen Kilby writes that when reading Rahner, "one is sure to come across the
term transcendental, and in many disguises." 35 She states that "Rahner is described as a
transcendental Thomist and as a proponent of transcendental theology." 36 Rahner speaks
of "transcendental experience, transcendental revelation, human transcendence or
transcendentality, of transcendental investigations, and of transcendental anthropology." 37
In Rahner's thought, "to transcend means to surpass, to go beyond or above, and one might
expect 'transcendental' to have something to do with that which goes beyond or rises above
something. " 38
Rahner's starting point is to see the human person as a question: "We must reflect

first ofall upon man as the universal question which he is for himself." 39 When the human
person faces themselves as a question, then that "creates the condition of really hearing,
and the only answer brings the question to its reflective self-presence."40 In Spirit in the

World, Rahner writes, "Man questions. This is something final and irreducible ... Man
questions necessarily ... this necessity can only be grounded in the fact that being is
accessible to man at all only as something questionable [Fragbarkeit], that he himself is
insofar as he asks about being, that he himself exists as a question about being."41

35

Karen Kilby, Karl Rahner: Theology and Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2004), 32 .

36

Ibid.

37

Ibid.

38

Ibid.

39

Rabner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 11.

40

Ibid.

41

Karl Rabner, Spirit in the World, trans. William Dych (New York: Continuum, 1994), 57.

12

For the human person, to question is as essential as breathing. However, questioning does
not bring the person outside of himself or herself but, rather, within. Rahner writes, "The
question about being as a transcendental question consciously turns upon itself, looks and
questions itself, it reveals itself as a knowledge of man about his questioning essence: he is
already with being in its totality (beim Sein im ganzen): otherwise, how could he ask about
it?'"' 2 Gregory Brett points out that the human person is able to recognize a broader context
within which the question has been asked and is open to "more" reality. 43 It is in the "act
of knowing any particular thing, the human being is already 'beyond' this immediate object
and has an awareness of the whole range of possible objects, or being as such. " 44 Rahner
writes,
In his first question (which always takes place with the question of being as its
ground) he is already quodamodo omnia (in a certain way everything), and still he
is not yet that, he is still nothing, 'tabula rasa, materia prima in ordine intellectus'
(a clean slate, prime matter in order of intellect), for precisely what he does is ask
what he means when he asks about being in its totality. 45
A person, "insofar as he experiences himself as conditioned and limited by sense
experience, and all too much conditioned and limited, he has already transcended this sense
experience." 46 The transcendence of the human person is "always orientated towards the
holy mystery." 47 It is by this that the questioning human person experiences his or her
finiteness and "reaches beyond this finiteness and experiences himself a transcendent

42

Rahner, Spirit in the World, 60

43

Brett, Theological Notion Human Person, 52.

44

Ibid.

45

Rahner, Spirit in the World, 60

46

Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 20.

47

Ibid., 21.

13

being, as spirit," as a "being with an t11;finite horizon."48 Rahner writes that "the infinite
horizon of human questioning is experienced as a horizon which recedes further and further
the more answers man can discover."49 This transcendental experience, the being "whom
we call 'God' encounters man in silence, encounters him as the absolute and the
incomprehensible." 50 Egan explains that it is the call of mystery that "explains why our
questions never cease, why we eventually must ask ultimate questions, and why we are
never satisfied totally with anything in this life." 51 For Rahner, mystery is "the horizon
which cannot be mastered and which masters all of our understanding, and which allows
the other to be understood by being present to itself in its silence and in its
incomprehensibility." 52 This relates to Rahner's view on the transcendental nature of
human beings, which is very much at the heart of his theology. Rahner states, "Man [as a
being is] mystery in his essence, his nature... beings who are referred to the
incomprehensible God. But this reference, which is our nature, can only be conceived and
understood when we allow ourselves freely to be grasped by the incomprehensible." 53
Thus, Rahner believes that "our whole existence is the acceptance or rejection of the
mystery which we are, as we find our poverty referred to the mystery of the fullness." 54 In
this respect, mystery is not something to be discovered so that it ceases to be a mystery.

48

Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 32.

49

Ibid.

50

Ibid.

51

Egan, "Theology and Spirituality," 19.

52

Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 217 .

53

Karl Rahner, "On the Theology of the Incarnation." in Theological Investigations, vol. 4, More
Recent Writings , trans. Kevin Smyth (London: Darton, Longman, 1966), 108.
54

Ibid., 109.
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Instead, "mystery is our nature, because the transcendence which we are and which we
accomplish brings our existence and God's existence together: and both as mystery." 55
A significant point for Rabner in his anthropology is his use of the transcendental
pre-apprehension ( Vorgrif.f) of being. On this, Rabner states that "man is a transcendent
being insofar as all of his knowledge and all of his conscious activity is grounded in a preapprehension of 'being' as such, in an unthematic but ever-present knowledge of the
infinity ofreality." 56 Kilby explains the concept of Vorgrifjby explaining the sources from
which Rabner drew:
To characterize the Vorgrif.f, and its relation to our knowledge or choice of
particulars, Rabner relies on a number of images. One is taken from Heidegger: we
are aware of infinite being as the horizon for our knowledge of finite things. An
awareness of being and of God, to put it another way, forms the ever-present and
necessary background for our knowledge of the particular objects that lie in the
foreground of consciousness. A second image is borrowed from (though not
original to) Aquinas: the Vorgriff is the light which in illuminating the individual
objects allows our intellect to grasp them. A third image, that of movement, Rabner
owes chiefly to Marechal: we have a dynamism towards being and God, so that the
mind always moves beyond any particular, never entirely satisfied or at rest. 57
The expression 'mind always moves beyond any particular' can be understood in
the sense that we transcend ourselves even in our thinking. This speaks to Rabner's point
about the human person as a transcendent being. Kilby notes, "Rabner is always careful to
insist, not to confuse the kind of awareness we have of being and of God with our
knowledge of finite objects." 58 At least the first two of the three images that characterize

55

Rahner, "Theology of the Incarnation." 109.

56

Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith , 33.

57

Kilby, Karl Rahner, 20.

58

Ibid.

15

Rahner' s use of Vorgriff can help us make the distinction between the two kinds of
knowing.
Rahner says that in order "to determine the breadth of the horizon" that we want to
pre-apprehend, the question to ask is this: "Is this horizon that of the imagination of infinite
space and time, or is it broader, in principle unlimited in every dimension, the horizon of
being absolutely, which discloses itself as transcending space and time?"59 The nature of
this pre-apprehension is not in the "object of human knowledge," because it would mean
that our pre-apprehension would be "conditioned by another pre-apprehension."60 Rahner
tells us that "this 'wither' (Worauj) of the pre-apprehension as such is not a humanly
conceivable object." 61 Pre-apprehension is a way that we understand human knowledge
but "pre-apprehension goes beyond what is 'grasped. '"62 Pre-apprehension is, then, not just
about what can be grasped or about the attainment of human knowledge, but rather it is the
act of pre-apprehending itself that moves us "towards the totality of the object. " 63
Another aspect that is important to consider before delving into Rahner's
evolutionary view is his understanding of the self-communication of God. God's selfcommunication is not merely God speaking in a language that the human person can
understand. In God's self-communication, what is "communicated is really God in his own
being, and in this way it is a communication for the sake of knowing and possessing God
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in immediate vision and love."64 In other words, "the giver is the gift given."65 Rahner
writes that God's self-communication "has 'divinizing' effects in the finite existent in
whom this self-communication takes place." 66 Stephen J. Duffy further explains that, for
Rahner, grace "is first and foremost God in self-communication." 67 Grace is something
accessible to everyone, and it is the heart of one's existence. Grace is not elusive as grace
is present in one's relationship with God. If grace is the self-communication of God, then
this self-communication is addressed to all creation. In his Theological Investigations essay
"Theology and Anthropology," Rahner explains grace from

a transcendental

anthropological framework:
Grace is God himself in self-communication, grace is not a 'thing' but - as
communicated grace - a conditioning of the spiritual and intellectual subject as
such to a direct relationship with God ... it can only be understood from the point
of view of the subject, with his transcendental nature, experienced as a being-inreference-to the reality of absolute truth and free-ranging, infinite, absolutely valid
love. It can only be understood in one's innermost regions as an immediacy before
the absolute mystery of God, i.e. as the absolute realization of man's transcendental
nature itself, made possible by God in his self-communication. 68
Duffy writes that "grace is neither detraction from, nor alien addition to, the
authentically human, but fulfillment of the openness to the mystery energizing the heart's
drive to self-realization. Grace is ground, polestar, and goal of the human joumey."69
Therefore, all truly human activity is a free, positive or negative, response to God ' s offer
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of self-the grace at the heart of human existence. Because God offers nothing less than
God's very own self to everyone, the human person is, to Rahner's way of thinking, homo

mysticus, mystical person. 70

3. An Evolutionary View
At the beginning of the long chapter on Jesus Christ in Foundations , Rahner states
that we have now arrived at what is "decisively Christian in Christianity." 71 William Dych
highlights the fact that Rahner' s evolutionary theory is within the context of asking, "how
can the classical 'descending' Christology of God becoming incarnate in the world and in
humanity be supplemented by an 'ascending' Christology which begins with the world and
humanity, and sees them as moving towards this point of unity with God?"72 He traces
three main steps on how Rahner shows this affinity and thereby an "ascending Christology
of the world's movement towards unity with God." 73
First, there is the intrinsic unity of matter and spirit in the sense of the evolutionary
movement of the material world towards spiritual existence. Secondly, there is the
intrinsic unity between human spiritual existence and the life of grace freely
bestowed by God. Thirdly, there is the intrinsic unity between the union of human
beings with God in grace and the hypostatic union of the man Jesus with God. 74
Dych observes that "in Rahner's cosmic vision the being of the whole created universe
moves towards its fulfillment in human being, and human being moves towards its
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fulfillment in Jesus Christ."75 Thus, Rabner's cosmology, anthropology, and Christology
are "intrinsically related moments within this single vision." 76
The intrinsic unity of spirit and matter is an important point for Rabner. This also
clarifies that his thoughts on spirit and matter are far from a Cartesian body-soul dualism.
Cartesian dualism was a result of Rene Descartes grappling with "the thinking activity of
the knower" yet being embodied in the material world. 77 This required some disengagement
on the part of the thinking knower from the usual bodily perspective. Descartes, who was
mostly a physicalist, believed that "all basic bodily functions were aspects of a physical
'machine,' and that the functioning of animals did not transcend these mechanisms. " 78
Believing the body to be a physical machine and unable to imagine "how rationality could
be manifest by a machine," Descartes sharpened the distinction between body and soul. 79
Brett notes that Rabner "sets out to avoid the anthropological dualism present in the
traditional distinction between body and soul."80

4. Active Self-Transcendence

The key phrases relevant to the notion of active self-transcendence, which Rabner
uses in Foundations, are "becoming" (as in "becoming something more"), "surpassing of
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self," "intrinsic increase of its own being," and "emptiness actively achieving its own
fullness." 81 The power of the absolute fullness of being is so intrinsic to the finite existent
that this finite existent is empowered to achieve a real and active self-transcendence. 82
Thus, the notion of self-transcendence "includes transcendence into something
substantially new, a leap to something essentially higher. " 83 Rahner tells us that 'matter' in
creation has evolved towards 'spirit' in a process of active self-transcendence made
possible by the power of the absolute being. In this respect, the process of active selftranscendence is related to the emergence of matter in creation, and from matter, life
emerges.
The notion of active self-transcendence expresses Rahner's own concern as to how
one can understand the salvific destiny of the human person. However, active selftranscendence is broader and more inclusive than just the human person, for the notion
includes the emergence of everything, including the entire evolutionary process. It is key
that one sees active self-transcendence as the development of matter in the direction of the
spirit under the dynamism of the absolute being. 84 This development from within towards
what is essentially higher, conceived as a being's "self-transcendence," can be thought of
as "evolution."85
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The concept of active self-transcendence is also important to the way human
persons can understand themselves today. Rahner tells us that "an essential trait in modem
man's understanding of himself and of his world is the conviction that the world is not a
static reality, but rather a world in process of becoming, subject to the process of evolution
and history." 86 In his own modest way, Rahner integrated the evolutionary understanding
of science to present a trajectory of how one can perceive the development of the universe
since the beginning of time. This evolutionary perspective is the notion of active selftranscendence. The key concepts remain the same throughout his writings. In this respect,
Rahner's thought in the notion of active self-transcendence has been rather consistent in
his writings. 87
We must recognize the possibility of a genuine development from below into
something higher, denying neither that this 'something higher' is genuinely new in
time, nor that it has connections with what already exists in time. And if we do this
then in the very nature of the case we cannot escape from the concept of becoming
as a genuine process of self-transcendence. All creaturely being is being in process
of becoming, but all becoming, if it is really worthy of the name, is the becoming
of that which is qualitatively higher, and which, nevertheless, is the act of that
which is lower. And it is precisely this that is signified when we speak of selftranscendence. That which is higher is not merely added on to the lower stages in
the world's development, but is actually enacted and attained to through these lower
stages in a process of genuine self-transcendence. What was formerly signified by
the terms 'conservatio' and 'concursus' in Christian theology is nothing else than
the dynamic impulse towards precisely this self-transcendence present in all being
in virtue of the immanence of God. 88
In summary, active self-transcendence can be understood as follows: (I) there is a genuine
development from something lower to higher, and all creaturely being is in the process of
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becoming; (2) true becoming must be conceived as "becoming more," a real surpassing of
self or a leap to a higher nature; and (3) becoming takes place by the dynamism of the
power of the absolute being.89 Points (1) and (2) will be important to our discussion on
emergence later. Point (3) is the place where this thesis will contribute to the discussion of
emergence, although, admittedly, the scientific community will not consider the dynamism
of the power of the absolute being as the cause and reason for matter actively selftranscending.
What does it mean to say that the process of becoming takes place through the
dynamism of the power of the absolute being? First, it speaks to the 'immanence' of God.
God has always been immanently present within creation. This immanent presence of God
is understood as a "fundamental relationship, which God bears on the world." 90 This
relationship is not "merely that of the Creator in the creature" but rather the "indwelling of
God in the spiritual creature through grace."9 1 Rabner states that the "immanence of God
in the world must be conceived of as of so radical a kind that the process of selftranscendence inherent in being in process of becoming genuinely is and remains an active
process of self-transcendence."92 Rabner holds that the "transcendence of God must be
maintained ... by reason of God's sovereign independence of the world ... [to] ensure that
what emerges from this process of becoming is that which is genuinely new." 93 For Rabner,
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that which is "new" represents a mode of being that was not previously there before, though
he states that "even the very highest, although it is essentially new, can be understood as a
variation of what existed previously." 94 The notion of active self-transcendence shows that
"the state of becoming genuinely inherent in the world of itself postulates the fact that God
is simultaneously immanent and transcendent in it in a single act." 95
By showing that the self-transcendence of creation "takes place within the
dynamism of the power of absolute being," Rahner takes pains to note that God does not
intervene with the processes of the universe and the world. 96 This issue is also pertinent to
the current discussion about God's non-divine intervention in the world.97 The framework
of active self-transcendence is Rahner' s way of seeing "God's operation as an enduring,
active support of cosmic reality ... elaborated in such a way that this divine operation itself
is envisaged as actively enabling finite beings themselves by their own activity to transcend
themselves. " 98
Rahner states that the process of active self-transcendence is what Christians
understand by 'preservation' and 'cooperation' of the universe. This refers to the Christian
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perspective of the doctrine of creation. The question is how God continues to act in the
universe after the act of creation. The Vatican Council I document Dei Filius states, "By
his providence God protects and governs all things, which he has made, 'reaching mightily
from one end of the earth to the other, and ordering all things well'. For 'all are open and
laid bare to his eyes ' , even those things which are yet to come into existence through the
free action of creatures." 99 Dei Filius presents a classical perspective that God created the
universe out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo) and continues to hold it in being (creatio

continua). Church Father Athanasius taught that God made creatio ex nihilo and that "the
presence of the Word in nature is necessary, not only for its original Creation, but also for
its permanence, or else, everything that 'is' , should be broken up again into nothingness." 100
The perspective of God's conservatio (preservation) and concursus (cooperation) in
Christianity can also be found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC), which tells
us, "With creation, God does not abandon his creatures to themselves. He not only gives
them being and existence, but also, and at every moment, upholds and sustains them in
being, enables them to act and brings them to their final end." 10 1 The CCC also states that
"God is the sovereign master of his plan. But to carry it out he also makes use of his
creatures' cooperation." 102 Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence tells us how this
can be, which is through the creative dynamism of the power of God that is intrinsic in all
creation.
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Rahner also speak repeatedly about spirit and matter in his notion of active selftranscendence. Thus, it is important to understand what he means by "spirit" and "matter."
Throughout his writings, Rahner emphasizes the intrinsic unity of spirit and matter. In
"Christology in the Setting of Modem Man's Understanding of Himself and of His World,"
Rahner writes that "the Christian professes in his Faith that all things - heaven and earth,
the material and the spiritual world - are the creation of one and the same God" and that
the variety and differences in creation can "be seen to form a unity in origin, self-realization
and determination, in short: one world." 103 In another place, Rahner writes, "Spirit and
matter have necessarily an intrinsic connection with one another, because both of them
derive from the one infinite Spirit which is God as their Creator." 104 Thus, we cannot think
of spirit and matter as existing alongside each other. Rahner points out that, firstly, the
unity of spirit and matter is seen most clearly in the human person. 105 Secondly, the history
of the development of spirit and matter "can be thought of as an 'evolution,' i.e., as
development from within towards what is essentially higher, provided 'becoming' (in the
full sense of the word) is conceived as a being's 'self-transcendence."' 106
Since according to Christian philosophy and theology every created being, because
finite, is in a state of becoming and changing and is part of the unity of the world
which is directed towards a single goal of full accomplishment, the concept of
evolution can be employed to describe, in a general and comprehensive way, what
characterizes all the reality, distinct from God, which lies within the horizon of our
experience. 107
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In Rahner's framework, creation is the "self-bestowal of God" who "communicates
his own reality to the other." 108 Thus, "creation can and should be conceived of as an
element in, and prior setting for, the self-bestowal of God, that act in which he does not
create something different from himself and set it over against himself, but rather
communicates his own reality to the other." 109 Denis Edwards explains Rahner's thought
in stating, "God chooses to give God's self in love to what is not divine, and so creation
comes to be." 110 It is in this sense that we can speak of God as being always immanently
present within creation. It is through this foundation of God's creative self-bestowal that
the world emerges, enveloped in the history of God, while achieving "an ever-higher
degree of self-transcendence." 111
It is the spirit that makes sense of matter. Much of the science begins and ends with

the study of matter. Rahner's work seems to indicate very strongly that matter expresses
the spirit. He writes, "What is material, therefore, is for a Christian, theistic philosophy
only conceivable at all precisely as a factor in relation to spirit and for the sake of (finite)
spirit." 11 2 An important point on this is Rahner's use of the term gefrorener, which is
German for 'frozen' to describe matter. Rahner refers to Thomistic philosophy that
regarded matter or what is material as a kind of "limited" or "solidified" spirit. 11 3 Patrick
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Burke explains that Rabner's "notion of matter as 'frozen spirit' and an evolutionary
worldview can be reconciled only on the double precondition that matter exists only for
and in view of spirit and that God, as the ground of all inner-worldly becoming, 1s
immanent within the process precisely by being transcendent over it." 114
Matter is "materia prima" (prime matter) that has a negative character where "in
itself and of itself connoting no real act and no positive reality, [and] is precisely the same
being and perfection which, independently of such limitation and apart from it, connotes
spirit, immanence and cognition." 11 5 Rabner also mentions the intrinsic negativity of
matter, by which he means that matter by itself cannot transcend or rise above itself. 11 6 For
Rabner, "spirit, at least finite spirit, can never be thought of in such a way that in order to
attain perfection it must move away from material reality, or that its perfection increases
in proportion to its distance from matter." 11 7 Rather, "spirit must be thought of as seeking
and finding itself through the perfection of what is material. " 11 8 Rabner' s thoughts on matter
appear to be more developed and clearer in Theological Investigations than in
Hominisation, where he states that "matter is, therefore, the openness and the bringing-

itself-to-appear of the personal spirit in the finite world and hence is from its very origin
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related to the spirit, is a moment in the spirit, and indeed a moment of the eternal Logos as
he freely but in fact exists, and this for all etemity." 119
Earlier, Rabner said that the development of matter into something that is higher
than itself is what Christian metaphysics and theology call God's immediate conservatio
(preservation) and concursus (cooperation). 120 Rabner understands creation to be the selfbestowal of God and that God is the transcendent ground of everything. God is "present as
the ground, implicitly and simultaneously affirmed, of every reality met with and affirmed,
and as being, which is the ground of what is, but always present as mediated by finite
things." 121 It is along these lines that Rabner saw that it is only by the divine operation of
God, which is an enduring, active support of cosmic reality, that enables finite beings to
transcend themselves. 122
Edwards states that the core idea of Rabner's notion of self-transcendence is in
God's immanent presence, which enables and empowers evolutionary emergence. 123 The
"fundamental effect of God's immanent presence" is that "creation has the capacity for
self-transcendence." 124 Rabner's "two concepts of divine self-bestowal and creaturely selftranscendence are interrelated: it is God's self-bestowal that enables and empowers
creaturely self-transcendence." 125 Rabner "considers the transitions to the new in the history
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of the umverse, particularly when matter becomes life, and when life becomes selfconscious spirit." 126 In Rahner' s concept of active self-transcendence, "there is an
evolutionary dynamism that is truly intrinsic to creation but occurs through the creative
power of the immanent God." 127 According to Edwards, "the idea of self-transcendence
indicates that at the empirical level of science, the emergence of the new is completely
open to explanation." 128 In a nutshell, "the material universe transcends itself in the
emergence of life, and life transcends itself in the human. In human beings, the universe
becomes open to self-consciousness and freedom, and to a fully personal response to God's
self-bestowal in grace." 129

5. The End-Goal of Active Self-Transcendence

Having presented the notion of active self-transcendence, Rahner speaks of the
finality of the history of nature and spirit. He states,
If man is thus the self-transcendence of living matter, then the history of nature and
of spirit form an intrinsic and stratified unity in which the history of nature develops
towards man, continues on in him as his history, is preserved and surpasses in him,
and therefore reaches its own goal with and in the history of man ' s spirit. 130

Rahner has painted a trajectory where "the whole movement of creation reaches its
goal in the free and self-conscious human person," and in a certain sense, "the human
person sums up creation." 13 1 Through the evolutionary process, the "history of nature
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reaches its goal" in the human person, and now humanity must "continue its history." 132
The human person, who is the product of creation, has achieved "self-presence in the
cosmos," and "this self-presence of the cosmos in the spirit of individual persons has a
history which is still going on," both individually and collectively. 133 When we consider
the trajectory painted by Rahner by which the "cosmos becomes conscious of itself in man,
in his individuality and in the freedom he actualizes, [then] this process must also have a
final result." 134 Christian terminology usually expresses it as "man's final and definitive
state, his salvation, the immortality of the soul or the resurrection of the flesh," all of which
describes something of the "final and definitive state of fulfillment for the cosmos." 135
Rahner also further elaborates on how we can understand the Christian teachings on grace
and glory. The "immediate self-communication of God to spiritual creature takes place in
what we call 'grace' while this self-communication is still in its historical process, and
'glory' when it reaches fulfillment." 136 We can see now why Rahner considers the
evolutionary process as a history of matter towards spirit. This spirit is the self-presence of
creation in the cosmos, whose goal is the infinite and the ineffable mystery of God. He
writes,
The mystery which we call God gives himself in his divine existence, gives himself
to us for our own in a genuine act of self-bestowal. He himself is the grace of our
existence. We shall say, therefore, that what we mean by the creation is that the
divine being freely 'exteriorises' his own activity so as to produce non-divine being,
but does this solely in order to produce the necessary prior conditions for his own
divine self-bestowal in that free and unmerited love that is identical with himself;
132
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that he does this in order to raise up beings who can stand in a personal relationship
to himself and so receive his message, and on whom he can bestow not only finite
and created being distinct from himself, but himself as well. In this way he himself
becomes both giver and gift, and even more the actual source of man's own capacity
to receive him as gift. Thus the finite, of its very nature as finite, finds its ultimate
fulfillment in God as the mysterious infinite. 137

6. A Synthesis of Rahner's Notion

Rahner's thoughts on active self-transcendence are consistent m many of his
writings although his expression varies. My thoughts are that it would be helpful to
synthesize Rahner's notion from his various writings. My working definition of active selftranscendence is as follows: Active self-transcendence can be described as matter

developing in a process of becoming whereby the higher levels are orientated in terms of
an ever-increasing complexity with and through the lower levels of matter, giving rise to
something substantially new, a leap into something essentially higher. This is made
possible through the creative power of the absolute fullness of being that is so intrinsic to
the finite existent that this finite existent is empowered to achieve a real and active selftranscendence.
There are two points within Rahner's notion which I will emphasize. First, Rahner
uses the term 'higher' and 'lower' order to characterize a process of active selftranscendence. He writes, "The higher order always embraces the lower as contained in it,
it is clear that the lower always precedes the actual event of self-transcendence and prepares
the way for it by the development of its own reality and order. " 138 He further argues that
the lower not only prepares and that "which is higher is not merely added on to the lower
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stages in the world's development, but is actually enacted and attained through these lower
stages in a process of genuine self-transcendence." 139 The higher (levels) develop in
complexity with and through the lower (levels).
Second, Rahner's use of active self-transcendence states that "the development of
biologically organized materiality is orientated in terms of an ever-increasing
complexity." 140 In his essay "Christology Within an Evolutionary View of the World,"
Rahner speaks of "transcendence into what is substantially new, i.e. the leap to a higher
nature. " 141 Rahner' s thoughts appear to be similar and yet more inclusive by the time he
wrote Foundations of Christian Faith , stating it as "transcendence into something
substantially new, a leap to something essentially higher. " 142 I prefer the latter as I agree
with Rahner that the development of matter within the process of active self-transcendence
meant not only a growing complexity of matter into something substantially new but that
it is a leap to something essentially higher. The notion of active self-transcendence is thus
broadened and is inclusive of all creation.
Rahner relates the concepts he used for active self-transcendence with evolution. 143
Given what we know from the recent discoveries of science, emergence seems to be most
apt as the concept itself applies to the whole of creation and that ever since matter emerged
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at the beginning of the universe, it entered into a process of becoming, increasing in
complexity from something lower to something essentially higher.

7. Conclusion
We have seen the main ideas of active self-transcendence and how it integrates an
evolutionary view of the world. Rabner explained that everything was possible because of
the dynamic creative presence of the absolute being we call God. One can get a feel of the
characteristics that are important in Rabner's notion of active self-transcendence. For
example, there is unity in all things, there is a sense of a trajectory, there is a becoming in
matter where there is an increase of complexity, there is newness of something that had not
previously existed, and there is a description of the higher and lower.
The next chapter will present the scientific perspective of emergence, which
resonates closely with the concepts, meanings, and characteristics of active selftranscendence but is somewhat broader since it encompasses the scientific perspective.
Chapter two will begin by discussing the views of scientists and theologians on the
scientific perspective of emergence. Then, the chapter will dwell more deeply into core
concepts, meanings, and characteristics of emergence. Finally, it will speak of the
emergence of the conscious human person within an evolutionary perspective. Perhaps this
accomplishes to a certain extent what Rabner sought to achieve:
Naturally, it would in itself be desirable to show more concretely what common
traits are to be found in the evolution of material, living and spiritual beings - to
show (more exactly) how the merely material is a prelude in its own dimensions to
the higher dimension of life, and how the latter in its dimension is a prelude to the
spirit in its ever greater advance towards the border line to be crossed by selftranscendence. 144

144

Rahner, "Christology Within Evolutionary View," 168.

33

Chapter 2
The Scientific Perspective of Emergence

The goal of this chapter is to clarify and define the scientific perspective of
emergence. This chapter will accomplish this in three parts: A, B, and C.
The first part of this chapter will examine the concepts of emergence from
theologians and scientists. For example, the work of theologians Philip Clayton and Niels
Henrik Gregersen and of biologist Ursula Goodenough and neuroanthropologist Terrence
Deacon are helpful in this regard. Clayton and Gregersen offer helpful concepts about how
we can understand the scientific perspective of emergence. Meanwhile, Goodenough and
Deacon offer a much more comprehensive and definite scientific theory of how things can
emerge in the universe.
The second part of this chapter will draw on the perspective of emergence to
demonstrate that emergence can show us how the human person can emerge as a species
possessing consciousness and a wide sense of horizon. This section will begin by exploring
the work of psychologist, neuroanthropologist, and cognitive neuroscientist Merlin
Donald. The heart of Donald's argument is that the human brain evolved with culture,
resulting in the emergence of human persons with "hybrid-minds." Culture results in the
symbolic capacity of the human person, and with it, the externalization of memory.
Donald's argument shows that being able to store our memories in culture expands our
operational mental architecture vastly. Another person that can relate and expand Donald's
theory is cognitive scientist Joaquin M. Fuster. Fuster presents a unique feature of the
human person which has emerged through evolution. Fuster calls this "memory of the
future." The human brain is highly adaptive and interacts continuously with its
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environment. It maintains a continuous perception/action cycle that can integrate the past
with the future. Fuster will show a convergence of the perceptual ability of the brain in the
present, and this convergence enables the brain to make decisions into the future. Drawing
patterns across scientific theories can give us better insight to the emergence of the human
person possessing consciousness with a sense of self.
In the final part of this chapter, I will offer a working definition of emergence and
discuss the limitations of the argument. Using the scientific perspective of emergence, I
will explain how it can give robustness to Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence in
the third chapter.

Part A

1. Emergence and Complexity

The universe is an open question. It is a mystery. History shows us that the
questions 'why' and 'how' occupied the minds of philosophers through the ages. Today,
science asks these same questions and offers theories that help us to better understand the
universe in which we live. It is a misconception that science presents us with theories that
are based on observable facts alone. Theologian and physicist Ian Barbour argues that
theories of science "involve novel concepts and hypotheses not found in data, and they
often refer to entities and relationships that are not directly observable." 145 Theories of
science may influence the observation of data, and the "form of questions we asked
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determines the kind of answer we receive." 146 Barbour references the work of physicist and
historian Thomas Kuhn, who argued that "scientific data are strongly dependent on
dominant paradigms. " 147 A paradigm is "a cluster of conceptual and methodological
presuppositions embodied in an exemplary body of scientific work." 148 Creativity coupled
with imagination may cause a scientific paradigm shift and, thus, affect our view and
understanding of the world, such as the "Newtonian mechanics in the eighteenth century
or relativity and quantum physics in the twentieth century." 149 On this point, Barbour states
that "science does not lead to certainty. Its conclusions are always incomplete, tentative,
and subject to revision." 15° Furthermore, "theories change in time, and we should expect
current theories to be modified or overthrown, as previous ones have been. " 15 1 In the history
of science, there has been "a sequence of better and better theories or models, from Plato
to the classical theory of Newton to modem quantum theories." 152 However, Barbour
points out that "science does offer reliable procedures for testing and evaluating theories
by a complex set of criteria." 153
The scientific perspective of emergence is similar in this respect. It is a perspective
by which one can view and understand the universe in which one lives. Philosopher and
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theologian Philip Clayton states that "emergence is the philosophical position - more
accurately, the philosophical elaboration of a series of scientific results - that best
expresses the philosophical import of evolutionary theory." 154 It is the "naturalist position
most strongly supported by a synthetic scientific perspective - that is, by the study of
natural history across the various levels it has produced - as well as by philosophical
reflection." 155
The common use of the term emergence "refers to processes of coming forth from
latency, or to states of things arising unexpectedly." 156 It is generally recognized that the
term 'emergence ' was first used as a philosophical concept by English Philosopher George
Henry Lewes in his 187 5 Problems of Life and Mind. The term was popularized when it
was embraced by the British school of philosophy (usually referred to as British
emergentists) in the 1920s, in particular Samuel Alexander, C. Lloyd Morgan, and C.D.
Broad. 157 The emergence theory "was formed as a meta-scientific interpretation of
evolution in all its forms: cosmic, biological, mental , and cultural." 158
Gregersen tells us that there are three generally accepted views on which
emergentists can agree, even if"they differ in metaphysical orientation." 159 First, emergents
are qualitative novelties, for example, "weight is a "resulting property of aggregating
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matter, whereas the liquidity and surface tension of water are new, emergent qualities in
relation to the chemical compounds of hydrogen and oxygen." 160 Next, nature is a nested

hierarchy of ontological levels, meaning that "the higher emergent levels (e.g., living
organisms) include the lower levels (e.g. , inorganic chemistry), on which they are based."
Finally, emergents are explanatory holists, which is to say that the "higher levels are not
predictable from our knowledge of their constituent parts, and their operations are often in
principle irreducible to the lower levels." 16 1 This also means that bottom-up "microphysical
causation must be supplemented by various forms of top-down causation in order to
account for the properties and functions of the higher levels." 162 From the three views, this
chapter will consider the nested hierarchy of ontological levels and explanatory holists,
which fall under the ontological argument of emergence.
Deacon puts forth a supportive view, stating that emergence is a term "most often
used by scientists to describe the spontaneous appearance of unprecedented orderliness in
nature." 163 He argues that the term has been around for a century and was relevant in so far
as it could be used to explain the "unprecedented nature oflife and of mind with respect to
the other physical processes." 164 The term emergence today "connotes the image of
something coming out of hiding, coming into view for the first time - something without
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precedent and perhaps a bit surprising." 165 Thus, "emergence used in this context is
intended to convey the something-from-nothing impression that is produced when
unprecedented properties are produced spontaneously without the intervention of external
modification of a system." 166 Deacon posits that most uses of the "emergence concept
implicitly assume an effect that is manifested at ascending levels of scale. Natural
phenomena that are described as emergent tend to be mostly compositional in some
sense." 167 Deacon also states that scale is important in the discussion of emergence because
"an increased number of components increases iterative interaction possibilities." 168 He
adds, "With every iterated interaction, relational properties are multiplied with respect to
each other, so an increase in numbers of elements and chances increases the relative
importance of interaction parameters and related contextual variables." 169 'Iterative'
essentially means 'repetition' or 'frequency'. This also presents us with a way to
understand the term 'complexity' as it is most often used in emergence. Deacon states that
a more extensive definition of emergence might be something like an "unprecedented

global regularity generated within a composite system by virtue of the higher-order
consequences of the interactions of composite parts. " 170
Although Clayton argues on a similar point on the iterative model of emergence,
he expresses reservations on the preciseness of Deacon' s theory, especially on his three
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steps of emergent complexity as detailed in Deacon's paper on "The Hierarchic Logic of
Emergence." 17 1 Clayton was critical of Deacon's claim that in the iterative process, "stage
three emergence does not become a new starting point for a further process of emergent
complexity leading to new emergent wholes" and that "the system has achieved all the
ontological complexity there is to achieve." 172 Clayton's critique makes sense if Deacon's
statement means that a process of'development' or 'becoming' stops in a system. Deacon's
argument indicates that there comes a point in time when there can be no further increase
in matter that can give rise to novel emergents that are unpredictable, surprising, and
irreducible.
However, Clayton agrees with Deacon that increasing complexity within a system
"under certain conditions gives rise to emergent entities or units and they in tum becomes
more complex" until they produce further units that are "basic causal agents in their own
right, and the process begins again." 173 Clayton also noted that for this iterative model to
be correct, it would mean that "no single scientific discipline can express the precise nature
of emergence; emergence is a pattern that runs on a variety of different platforms. " 174
Clayton makes a valid point. First, the idea of complexity is central to the discussion
of emergence, supporting the scientific claims of the hierarchical levels in the processes of
nature. The iterative model provides a framework to understanding what complexity
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entails. Second, the emergence perspective offers a means to discern and integrate
scientific discoveries toward a wider understanding of ourselves and this universe we call
home.
Gregersen points out that '"emergence' and 'complexity' often travel together." 175
However, he also points out that not all "emergents arise from complexity, for quite a few
emergent phenomena, such as consciousness, take place by leaving out information, or by
ex-formation or de-complexification of neural firings." 176 He states that the "sensation of
something like ' scarlet red' is much simpler than an accurate description of the
environmental, sensory, and neural processes involved in the production of that particular
qualia." 177 That means that there can be a "series of arrows leading from complexity to
emergence to simplicity." 178 There can also be "cases that the arrow goes the other way
round, as when a fascination with scarlet red and other colours leads someone to become a
painter and thereby participate in the wider cultural circulation ofpaintings, schools of
painters, galleries, art buyers, and newspaper reviews." 179 Gregersen notes that in this case,
the "arrow goes from low-degree complexity to emergence to high-degree complexity. " 180
There are levels of complexity ranging from the complexation of molecular
interactions resulting in water or ice to complexity in evolution, spanning across time. This
thesis takes the point of view that complexity must be considered both from a wider
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perspective and through the lens of time. The process involved when life emerges from a
single cell continues in an upward trajectory, with an increase in complexity until plant and
animal life emerges. Thus, the wider perspective is to recognize that matter does increase
in complexity, and this complexity results in novel emergent properties such as the mind
and consciousness.
Physicist Paul Davies, who points out that it is not a simple matter to distinguish
precisely between random and organized complexity, also affirms my point above about
complexity, which must be considered from the perspective of time. For example, "we can
see a box of gas molecules rushing around at random and the elaborately organized activity
of a bacterium." 181 One clear fact is that "organized complexity of the sort exemplified by
life ... [has] been forged over deep time, through elaborate processing of matter and energy
and the operation ofratchets to lock in the products of this processing." 182
Emergence is a scientific perspective that depends on the research and discoveries
of scientists to understand the processes of the universe wherein complexity increases over
'deep time', resulting in the emergence of something higher from something lower. It is
because there is a recognition of the lower and higher that we can speak of a hierarchy of
levels. The irreducibility of nature is the other aspect of which we will speak in the next
section.
Gregersen points out that the theory of emergence developed during the period of
the Darwinian revolution of science was flatlined during the reductionist climate in the
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philosophy of science between the 1930s and 1960s, revived again in the 1970s thanks to
computer studies of complexity, and has since been supported by anti-reductionist trends
within the philosophy of science. 183 Thus, it is helpful to explore one context in which the
theory of emergence has been used, namely, against the reductionist perspective.

2. The 'Whole' is more than the 'Parts': The Problem of Reductionism
Harold Morowitz writes that Pope John Paul II once asked scientist and
psychologist John Holland the following question: "How are we to reconcile the
explanation of the world ... with the recognition that the whole is more than the sum of its
parts?" 184 The pope was looking at a perspective beyond the reductionist perspective, which
states that the parts explain the whole. One way to grasp the meaning of emergence is to
study the context of its usage, thereby addressing the reductionism perspective.
Barbour speaks of a form of epistemology called scientific materialism, which
asserts that matter is the fundamental reality in the universe and the scientific method is
the only reliable path to knowledge. 185 According to Barbour, "many forms of materialism
express reductionism," which is to say that "the laws and theories of all the sciences are in
principle reducible to the laws of physics and chemistry." 186 More importantly, scientists
and those who accept this view claim that "the component parts of any system determine
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its behavior." 187 For example, Francis Crick, co-discoverer of DNA (deoxyribonucleic
acid), opens his book The Astonishing Hypothesis with the following statement: "The
Astonishing Hypothesis is that 'you,' your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your
ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the
behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules .... 'You're
nothing but a pack of neurons. "' 188 Davies states, "The philosophy that the whole is nothing
but the sum of its parts is known as reductionism, and it has exercised a powerful grip on
scientific thinking." 189 He says that if the world is already explained at the level of
subatomic physics, then the notion of complexity loses most of its significance since the
lower levels explain everything. 190 This claim will even challenge what it means to be alive
because "no atom in the human body is living, and human bodies are nothing but a
combination of atoms." 19 1
Clayton states that the "discussion of emergence has grown out of the successes
and the failures of the scientific quest for reduction." 192 The re-emergence of the
"emergence theories presuppose that the once-popular project of complete explanatory
reduction - that is, explaining all phenomena in the natural world in terms of the objects
and laws of physics - is finally impossible." 193 The limitations of the philosophical position
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of reductionism does not mean that science will stop trying to explain "phenomena in terms
of their constituent parts and underlying laws." 194 Taking either the reductionistic
perspective or the perspective of emergence presupposes an understanding of natural
science with its goals, epistemic status, and relations to other areas of study, and this will
affect how scientists choose to pursue their discoveries and view their results. 195
Emergence moves in the opposite direction, which is "from the wholes to the
parts." 196 That the 'whole' is more than its 'parts' is an important aspect of how we can see
and understand the universe. For example, the human person cannot be understood merely
by the activities of the brain. As theology tends to look at the bigger picture, emergence
has also "become a central and almost necessary category for many theologians engaged
with the sciences." 197 For example, the perspective of emergence can add to the richness
of how we can see and understand ourselves and the universe we live in. It enables physicist
and theologian John Polkinghorn to claim that "many dimensions of the rich reality of
creation intersect in the human person." 198 The reductionist approach can contribute greatly
to the understanding of the human person. For example, the reductionists approach gave
us the DNA, but it does not tell the whole story and "any adequate anthropology will have
to do justice to these multiple dimensions of humanity." 199 Theologian Gregory Peterson
writes that the "theories of emergence provide a framework that makes scientific and
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theological claims compatible, even to the point of allowing the two to be yoked together
into a single synthesis."200 A reductionist stance can result in "a worldview that ultimately
denies the reality of higher-order pattern of entity, including the mind and ethical values. " 201
Goodenough and Deacon's essay "The Sacred Emergence of Nature" tells us that
emergence puts back together broken fragments that were taken apart by the reductionist
approach. 202 While acknowledging how "reductionism has yielded splendid results in
science, there is an important sense in which it is artificial, and in this sense false." 203 For
example, by starting "from wholes and moving 'down' into parts, one is moving in the
opposite direction from the way matters arise." 204 For emergentists, "to grasp how matters
arise, one must run the muscle movie backwards, from the subatom to the atom to the
amino acid to the protein to the polymer to the cell to the muscle to the contraction."205
According to them, it is important to begin the movie with "reductionist understandings
[because] otherwise, there is no way to know what to put in the movie." 206 Thus, "once it
is understood how proteins fold and myosin hydrolyses ATP and so on, [then] it is possible
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to narrate such understandings in the correct temporal and spatial sequence, movmg
'upwards' from one level to the next."207
Goodenough and Deacon state that scientists who engage in such 'upward' projects
"quickly arrive at an understanding that has in fact been around for some time." 208 They
present two phrases that are important to how we can understand and describe emergence.
First, they say that "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts." 209 Second, they claim
that "as one moves 'up' in levels of scale, one encounters 'something more from nothing
but' or, less euphoniously but more accurately, 'something else from nothing but. "' 2 10 They
note that "the point is not that one encounters something greater or something more, but
that one encounters something else altogether." 211 According to them, "this something else
can, in turn, participate in generating a new something else at a different level of
organization. That is, today's something else may be tomorrow ' s nothing but," and "the
now widely adopted term to describe such dynamics is emergence. "212
On the concept of emergence itself, Goodenough and Deacon writes, "Emergence
not only surrounds us in the non-living world; it is also the key dynamic of living
organisms, as in, for example, the emergence of contractility (something else) from the
interaction of myosin and actin polymers (nothing but)." 2 13 They state that "life has a
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number of additional features, however, and these are perhaps best appreciated by
considering ways that life may have emerged from non-life." 2 14 Goodenough and Deacon
also state that "all origin-of-life hypotheses are by definition speculative, since the default
assumption is that the original lifeform is no longer extant but went on to evolve into the
DNA-based, lipid-membrane-enclosed, protein-mediated, single-celled organisms that
served as the common ancestors of all modem lifeform."2 15
While the concept of emergence makes a good case against reductionism in many
important ways, the concept itself is more significant than that. Deacon particularly makes
this point. The use of emergence as merely anti-reductionist will result in the use of
emergence to fill in the gaps where "standard reductionistic accounts seem to be incomplete
in explaining apparent discontinuities." 2 16 He states that this negative use of emergence
"serves only as a philosophically motivated promissory note for a missing explanation that,
critics argue, is needed to fill in a gap." 2 17
The core arguments here are that the whole is more than the parts and that the whole
is not reducible to the parts. The reductionist perspective is important for understanding
the parts, but the perspective of emergence can help us see the bigger picture, such as
recognizing that we are more than our cells. Also, the term emergence can connote
'encounter' . For example, one encounters something new, and this something new can, in
tum, participate in generating a new something else at a different level of organization.

2 14

Goodenough and Deacon, "Sacred Emergence of Nature," 854.

2 15

Ibid.

2 16

Deacon, "Emergence," 123 .

2 17

Jbid.

48

3. Concepts of Emergence

Gregersen has told us earlier that "in ordinary language 'emergence' refers to
processes of coming forth from latency, or to a state of things arising unexpectedly." 21 8 In
his paper, he presents "a short philosophical primer consisting of four types of emergence
theory, two epistemological and two ontological."219 There are questions associated with
the emergent phenomena, such as "what is actually emerging?"220 Does what actually
emerges have "only properties, with no causal roles, or is it properties that involve new
causal capacities, some of which may even be formulated in the form of emergent laws?"
Also, can we "legitimately speak of new emergent individuals?"221 According to
Gregersen, these questions "are linked to the fundamental distinction between 'weak' and
'strong' claims of emergence." 222
Given the broadness of the concepts of emergence, Table I below presents an
overview of the argument outlined in the following pages. Table I spells out the claims of
what emergence, its meanings, and characteristics. It will also show how part B, which is
on the evolutionary development of the human person, fits into the argument of this thesis.
Hopefully, this will be helpful as we delve deeper into the topic. In chapter three, I will
demonstrate how the characteristics of emergence discussed in this chapter can enrich the
notion of active self-transcendence.
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Table 1: A brief outline on the discussion on emergence in this chapter.
Part A

3. Concepts of Emergence

Meanings and Characteristics

What is actually emerging? The questions
are related to the distinctions between weak
and strong claims of emergence below. (49)

3.2 Five Different Meanings of Emergence (52)
E1 (Emergence meaning one) refers to theories of
emergence within specific scientific fields. (53)

3.1. E(!istemological (Weak) Emergence
and Ontological (Strong) Emergence

E2 refers to the levels of emergence within the
natural world. (55)

Egistemological (Weak) Emergence (51)
(The first concept has two parts)

E3 refers to patterns across scientific theories.
(55-56)

Emergence 1 is a purely logical or
computational formofemergence. (52)

E4 refers to a theory about patterns in the
transitions between sciences. (56)

Emergence2 "refers to cases where new
physical properties appear but are fully
dependent on their subvenient physical
bases.(52)

Es refers to the metaphysics of emergence. (56-57)

3.3 Characteristics of Emergence (55)
(3 .3. I) monism (57-58)

Ontological (Strong) Emergence (51)
(The second concept also has two parts)

(3.3.2) hierarchical complexity (58-59)

Emergence3 "refers to cases where new
emergent properties, based on new spatial or
hierarchical configurations, acquire new
causal capacities in the context of relatively
enduring higher-order systems."(52)

(3 .3 .3) no monolithic law of emergence (59-61)
(3 .3.4) patterns across levels of emergence (6162)

Emergence 4 refers to special cases when
new emergent properties are based on new
spatial or hierarchical configurations and
"give rise to new causal capacities in the
context of relatively enduring higher-order
systems exhibiting not only self-referential
but also self-reflective and unified features
such as human consciousness.(54)

(3.3 .5) downward causation (62)
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Part B
An Evolutionary Perspective of the Human Person
The scientific perspective of emergence can show how something lower can emerge and develop into
something higher, in this case, properties of"openness" and "wide horizon" in one's consciousness.
J

\

T

PartC
Definitions and Clarifications
This section will offer a working definition to the scientific perspective of emergence and come
clarifications.
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3.1. Epistemological (Weak) Emergence and Ontological (Strong) Emergence
Weak emergence holds that "systemic features at 'higher' (or more comprehensive)
levels cannot be predicted by any finite knower from the standpoint of the pre-emergent
stage, despite a knowledge of the empirical characters and governing laws concerning the
ultimate constituents of that system." 223 Weak emergence is also known as "epistemological

emergence, since all the causal work is done at the base level. " 224
Regarding strong emergence, Gregersen states, "Emergent phenomena obtain new
causal capacities, which make it possible that higher-level or more comprehensive systems
can exert a top-down, selective influence on the lower-level (or local) constituents than
would otherwise have obtained." 225 Strong emergence is also termed " ontological, since
what is causally effective must be deemed real." 226
Gregersen points out that weak emergence can "also accord a sort of reality to the
higher-order qualities; namely the reality of being an epiphenomenon that should
nonetheless be taken with metaphysical seriousness, even if the emergent properties play
no causal role of their own." 227 On this, the "strong emergentist will admit that in many
cases emergent properties are only epiphenomena, without any new causal capacities." 228
One would have to investigate to determine whether an emergent phenomenon manifests
as weak or strong emergence.
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The two epistemological emergences (weak emergences) are Emergence' and
Emergence2 . Emergence' is a purely logical or computational form of emergence, as
investigated in strong programmes of computational complexity (CC). For example, Stuart
Kauffman worked within the paradigm of CC with the aim of explaining the evolutionary
appearance of life through a bottom-up computational approach.229 Emergence 1 is not
"necessarily related to the real physical world (apart from the fact that computer programs
are implemented on the hardware of Newtonian machines)." 230 Emergence2 "refers to cases
where new physical properties appear, but are fully dependent on their subvenient physical
bases. These properties are nothing but properties or attributes of the underlying level or
levels, and ultimately properties of physics." 231 An example of this will be the "emergence
of water strictly based on the intrinsic chemical properties ofH20.''2 32
Emergence3 and Emergence 4 are ontological or strong emergence. Emergence 3
"refers to cases where new emergent properties, based on new spatial or hierarchical
configurations, acquire new causal capacities in the context of relatively enduring higherorder systems." 233 Here, the emergent systems are not susceptible to their environments but
"are able to follow their own programmatic 'ends' even under changing circumstances
(say, the search for food when there is no food immediately available)." 234
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Emergence 4 refers to special cases where new emergent properties are based on
new spatial or hierarchical configurations and "give rise to new causal capacities in the
context of relatively enduring higher-order systems exhibiting not only self-referential but
also self-reflective and unified features such as human consciousness. In this case one
might speak of emergent individuals."235 The fourth case of emergence might be
controversial "since it assumes the existence of body-mind systems that have the form of
self-conscious unity, a form that is usually ascribed only to human persons." 236 Gregersen
notes that Clayton refers to this as "emergentist pluralism" and this allows Clayton to see
"the emergence of the human mind as continuous with other sorts of self-reproducing
systems," and as such, the "human person acts as a responsible person in relation to the
environment and to him or herself." 237 They "have the feature of being centres of intentions
and autonomous actions."238 This is because "what emerges in the human case is a
particular psycho-somatic unity, an organism that can do things both mentally and
physically."239 Clayton points out that we need sciences or modes of study to address the
level of complexity that is the human person. By this, Clayton means that he believes in
"the real existence and causal efficacy of the conscious or mental dimension of human
personhood. " 240
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Following Gregersen ' s discussion, this thesis leans toward ontological or strong
emergence. Strong emergence is closer to the evolutionary perspective of the universe and
oflife. Gregersen describes an emergent that which wants to follow its own programmatic
'ends ' or higher-order systems exhibiting not only self-referential but also self-reflective
and unified features such as human consciousness. A description by neurologist Antonio
Damasio is an example of strong emergence. He states that every cell in the human body
is made of cells that have exhibited intelligent and purposive behaviors not only for
survival but also for thriving by pooling resources, so to speak, with other cells. He says
that even "single cells had what appeared to be a decisive, unshakable determination to
stay ali ve for as long as the genes inside their microscopic nucleus commanded them to do
so."241

3.2. Five Different Meanings of Emergence
Clayton points out that emergence is a term that is not easily defined. He says that
there are no neutral definitions because "every conceptual clarification is actually a plea
for the reader to look at a subject in a particular way." 242 If pressed for a definition, Clayton
says that he would describe emergence as "the theory that cosmic evolution repeatedly

includes unpredictable, irreducible, and novel appearances." 243
In Mind and Emergence, Clayton discusses five meanings of emergence that might
help in the consideration of "what is the topic that emergence addresses" because in a
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broader discussion, emergence has been used in multiple fields. 244 Examining the meanings
of the term at each level, we can observe a "transition from very specific scientific domains
to increasingly integrative, and hence increasingly philosophical, concepts."245
The first meaning, E 1, refers to theories of emergence within specific scientific

fields and describes "features of a specified physical or biological system of which we have
some scientific understanding." 246 The specificity of the theory makes it difficult to
establish a connection with other fields of science.

fa refers to the levels of emergence within the natural world, such as "Stuart
Kauffman's notion of a new 'general biology' or in certain proposed theories of complexity
or self-organization." 247 On this, fa "expresses postulated connections or laws that may in
the future become the basis for one or more branches of science."248
E3 refers to patterns across scientific theories, and since "it postulates features that
are shared by multiple theories within science, E3 is actually a meta-scientific terrn." 249 fa
does not refer to a specific theory but an "observation about a significant pattern that
allegedly connects a range of scientific theories," such as the common features found in
"autocatalysis, complexity, and self-organization."250 The common feature can serve as a
heuristic function and "recognizing such broader patterns can help to extend existing
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theories, to formulate insightful new hypotheses, or to launch new interdisciplinary
research programmes. " 25 1

E4 refers to a theory about patterns in the transitions between sciences, and in this
sense, it is a "broader theory about the evolutionary process." 252 fa looks for the common
features between theories, but E4 goes beyond in its "attempt to explain why these patterns
should exist," while also allowing one to argue that "similarities and differences across
emergent systems are part of a broader pattern in nature." 253 An example of this is the
current work "to understand how chemical structures emerge out of the underlying physics,
to reconstruct the biochemical dynamics that underlie the origins of life, and to conceive
how complicated neural processes produce cognitive phenomena such as memory,
language, rationality, and creativity."25 4 E4 allows one to discern the broader patterns, but
in itself, it is not a scientific theory.

Es refers to the metaphysics of emergence, and it presents hypotheses about the
nature of reality as a whole. One may draw evidence or points from EI to E4, but
"metaphysical theories are not limited to the inferences from the available evidence."255 An
example of this is Clayton's conclusion that the implications of the consideration of
emergence lead to transcendence.
The work of this thesis takes the meaning of emergence in E4 and Es. For example,
the emergence of the human person is related to the broader pattern of the universe. This
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pattern can only be discerned at a broader level, and it includes the conditions that are
favorable to life at the beginning of the universe, right through to the development of
culture, which makes the expansion of the human brain possible. Es is particularly
important for relating theology and science, as we can see in the work of Clayton on
emergence and transcendence. 256

3.3. Characteristics of Emergence
This thesis has explored the perspective, concepts, and meanings of emergence.
Exploring the meaning above tells us of its significance to the discussion of the scientific
perspective of emergence. This thesis will now highlight five characteristics of emergence.
These are the properties, features, or traits that pertain to the scientific perspective of
emergence. They are by no means exhaustive, and we have seen some of them earlier. The
characteristics are as follows: (1) monism, (2) hierarchical complexity, (3) no monolithic
law of emergence, (4) patterns across levels of emergence, and (5) downward causation.
This section will explain what these characteristics are. It is in the next chapter that I will
show how these characteristics are important to the discussion of emergence.

3.3.1 . Monism

One important feature of emergence is monism. It states that "reality is ultimately
composed of one basic kind of stuff."257 Clayton calls this "ontological monism" and notes
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that this is different from physicalism, which says that everything is physical and only the
law of physics applies.258 This perspective aligns with the theory that the universe began
with the Big Bang and that there can be a trajectory from matter to life. It also gives ground
to the next characteristic, which is hierarchical complexity.

3.3.2. Hierarchical complexity
Hierarchical complexity recognizes that there is a hierarchical structure in the world

that has been in place since the beginning of the universe. This characteristic takes into
account the evolutionary perspective of the universe. Mathematician and physicist George
Ellis states, "The emergence of complex structure, including conscious life, from simpler
physical structures is based on tightly structured non-linear relations between components,
designed to produce specific higher-level functioning." 259 Ellis describes self-conscious
human beings as the "highest level of emergence. " 260 Each higher level will have more
entities "but fewer kinds of entities at the lower levels (atoms are made just of protons,
neutrons, and electrons), so complex objects with complex behaviour are made by highly
structured combinations of simpler objects with simpler behaviour."26 1 What happens at
the next level higher in terms of physical causation is caused by the lower levels. 262 The
"existence of higher-level complex behaviour, which does not occur at the lower levels,
then emerges from the lower-level properties both structurally and functionally (at each
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moment) and in evolutionary and developmental terms (over time)." 263 This is also an
example of an increase in complexity and proof that the lower is contained in the higher
but that the higher is a completely new emergent that had not previously existed before. 264
Refer to Table 2 below for the hierarchy of structure. Clayton tells us that the "rapid
expansion of solid empirical work in complexity theory now allows us to quantify the
increase in complexity, at least in some cases."265
Table 2. The hierarchy of structure
Sociology/ Politics/ Economics
Animal Behavior/ Psychology
Botany/ Zoology/ Physiology
Cell Biology
Biochemistry/ Molecular Biology
Molecular Chemistry
Atomic Physics
Nuclear Physics
Particle Physics
Source: Ellis, "On the Nature of Emergent Reality," 80.

3.3.3. No monolithic law of emergence
No monolithic law of emergence is another characteristic that is important to the

scientific perspective of emergence. Clayton points out that many "of the details of the
process of emergence - the manner of the emergence of one level from another, the
qualities of the emergent level, the degree to which the 'lower' controls the 'higher,' etc. -
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vary greatly depending on which instance of emergence one is considering."266 This
characteristic is important in relation to E4. Not having a monolithic law of emergence will
allow one to explore and discern patterns in the transitions between sciences.
The work of biophysicist Harold J. Morowitz is an example of why there should
not be only one perspective on what constitutes emergence. He presents a "catalog of 28
observed instances that have emergence in common but vary over an enormous range in
the agents, interactions, hierarchical levels, and character of the interaction rules and the
pruning rules." 267 The twenty-eight observed instances of emergence are derived "from an
almost linear chronological sequence from the beginning of the universe." 268 The
"complexity, diversity, and richness that we see today [in the universe,] on all scales of
sizes have emerged since the beginning in a long sequence of physical process."269 The
twenty-eight instances of emergence that Morowitz observed are the primordium, largescale cosmological structures, stars and nucleosynthesis, elements and the periodic table,
solar systems, planetary structure, geospheres, metabolism, cells-prokaryotes, cellseukaryotes, multicellularity, neurons and animalness, deuterostomes, cephalization, fish,
amphibians, reptiles, stem mammals, arboreal mammals, primates, apes, hominids, tool
makers, language, agriculture, technology, philosophy, and the next emergence (i.e., the
spirit). 270 Morowitz's presentation gives us a sense of how broad the concept of emergence

266

Clayton, Mind and Emergence, 61 .

267

Morowitz, Th e Emergence ofEverything, 25.

268

Ibid.

269

Davies, "Towards an Emergentist Worldview," 3.

270

Morowitz, "Emergence of Transcendence," in Gregersen, 178.

60

can be. It is understandable why Clayton states that "emergence should be viewed as a term
of family resemblance." 27 1

3.3.4. Patterns across levels of emergence
The point above connects us to the next important characteristic in the argument of
emergence: patterns across levels of emergence. Clayton identifies five particular
commonalities shared by various instances of emergence in natural history that we can
recognize and defend. This does not eliminate other commonalities where they may exist.
First, "LI is prior in natural history," and second, "L2 depends on L1 , such that if the states
in L1 did not exist, the qualities in L2 would not exist."272 The third is the point that "L2 is
the result of a sufficient degree of complexity in LI . In many cases one can even identify
a particular level of criticality which, when reached, will cause the system to begin
manifesting new emergent properties."273 In other words, an increase in complexity is
necessary for a new emergent. This leads to the fourth point Clayton makes, which is that
"one can sometimes predict the emergence of some new or emergent qualities on the basis
of what one knows about L1 ." 274 However, Clayton points out that using L1 will not allow
one to "be able to predict (i) the precise nature of these qualities, (ii) the rules that govern
their interaction (or their phenomenological patterns), or (iii) the sorts of emergent levels
to which they in tum may give rise in due course."275 The final important point in the
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perspective of emergence speaks to the irreducibility of emergence. Clayton states that "L2
is not reducible to Ll in any of the standard senses of 'reduction' in the philosophy of
science literature: causal, explanatory, metaphysical, or ontological reduction."276
This relates to the fourth meaning of emergence in E4, which, as we have seen
above, is concerning the theory about patterns in the transitions between sciences. Like E4,
this allows one to discern the broader patterns, but in itself it is not a scientific theory.

3.3.5. Downward causation

The final characteristic is downward causation. The basic idea is that "L2 can
exercise some causal effect on L1" at an ontological level. 277 Clayton states that "the world
is such that it produces systems whose emergent properties exercise their own distinct
causal influences on each other and on (at least) the next lower level in the hierarchy." 278
One example of downward-causation, or top-down causation, is by Donald Campbell
(1974) to denote "the way in which the network of an organism's relationship to its
environment and its behavior patterns together determine in the course of time the actual
DNA sequences at the molecular level present in an evolved organism." 279 However, "from
a 'bottom-up' viewpoint of that organism once in existence, a molecular biologist would
tend to describe its form and behavior as a consequence of the same DNA sequence."280
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Campbell argues for a top-down causal role in the "evolutionary development of
efficacious jaws made of suitable proteins in a worker termite." 281
Downward-causation, or top-down causation, tells us that there is an interconnectedness within the conditions of how something can emerge. Another example,
which we will see in more detail, is the uniqueness of the human person, which has emerged
during the evolutionary process and has also been shaped by their environment such as by
culture.
From here, we can see the broadness of the term emergence. The first part of this
chapter has shown how it is related to the term complexity and its uses, such as against the
position of reductionists. However, I pointed out that the understanding of emergence is
broader by using Clayton ' s explanation of the variety of its meanings and characteristics.
It does not seem complete without a concrete example, and the next section of this chapter
will touch on the emergence of the human person from an evolutionary perspective. Even
without the thesis intending to do so, one can observe that the broader patterns observed
by Donald and Fuster in the next section will seem extraordinarily close to the
transcendental anthropology of Rahner that we have seen in the first chapter, such as that
the human person is 'open' and continually 'self-expanding'.
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PartB

In the second part of this chapter, I will propose that the human person, who has
achieved consciousness, is essentially open and stands before a wide horizon. Furthermore,
openness before a wide horizon is an emergent trait that comes from consciousness.
Properties such as 'openness' or 'wide horizon' are things that are intangible. Nonetheless,
I will demonstrate that they are real by using the scientific perspective of emergence that
was discussed previously, showing the possibility of integrating a variety of patterns across
levels of emergence as an example of how something lower can emerge and develop into
something higher.

4. The Transition to Hybrid-Minds

Donald tells us that since "complex life evolved from inert matter, it follows that
consciousness also evolved from inert matter." 282 He calls this "emergentism," and it is a
credible approach because consciousness is "an aspect of the natural world" and "must
have evolved, like every other property of life." 283 Donald's perspective is worth
considering. Donald expands the model of how the human person emerged by focusing on
more than the human person alone. He argues that human minds are not isolated. His
"central thesis is that human beings have evolved a completely novel cognitive strategy:
brain-culture symbiosis," which he calls 'hybrid-mind. ' 284 As a consequence of this
symbiosis, "the human brain cannot realize its design potential unless it is immersed in a
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distributed communication network, that is, a culture, during its development. The human
brain is, quite literally, specifically adapted for functioning in a complex symbolic
culture." 285 It must be greatly emphasized that the key to understanding how Donald sees
human cognitive development lies in culture. Thus, his work speaks of the co-evolution of
the brain and culture. Culture is the reason why we are the way we are today. To underscore
the importance of culture, Donald states that any "serious failure to establish this socialcognitive connection can result in delayed development and in some cases, such as autism,
in a permanent developmental disability." 286 In fact, the early cultural bond is important
because "the human brain has evolved a dependency on culturally stored information for
the realization of its design potential."287
According to Donald, the great divide between humans and other species is the
"computational divine," also known as the "symbolic computation."288 It is in this sense
that Donald believes that we might be called "hybrid minds," as we maintain a balance
between two computational modes of operation, which is part analog and part symbolic. 28 9
As human persons, we operate with conventional nervous systems, but we are also capable
of "constructing languages and symbols, such as those found in storytelling, art, and
mathematics. These typify the symbolic mode." 290
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The language inside the human mind is a symbolic representation that arises from
and describes phenomena outside the brain. For Donald, "culture leads, and mind follows.
In other ways, mind leads. Symbolic culture is nothing without the human mind, while the
human mind, without culture, remains locked in incoherently upon itself."29 1
Many of the elements present in Donald's work agree with the research by Deacon,
whose work has combined human evolutionary biology and neuroscience. In his book,
Deacon calls human beings "symbolic species." 292 He argues that "the doorway into this
virtual world was opened to us alone by the evolution oflanguage, because language is not
merely a mode of communication, it is also the outward expression of an unusual mode of
thought - symbolic representation." 293 Language makes possible the novelty that arises
from the emergence of the human person. Language "offers a means for generating an
essentially infinite variety of novel representations, and an unprecedented inferential
engine for predicting events, organizing memories, and planning behaviors. " 294 In addition,
language "entirely shapes our thinking and the ways we know the physical world." 295
Donald presents three main transitions of human cognitive evolution. The
transitions which caused three shifts in the nature of consciousness during our evolution,
are as follows : (1) more precise and self-conscious control of action in mimesis, (2) richer
and faster accumulation of cultural knowledge in speech, and (3) much more powerful and
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abstract reflective cultures, driven by symbolic technology. 296 They are important because
the transitions demonstrate the expansion of the human person, which, among other things,
resulted in the ability for symbolic capacity and openness.
Donald places the mimesis stage in early hominins, peaking in homo erectus to be
from about four million to four hundred thousand years ago.297 According to Donald, "the
first cognitive transition seems to have revolved around one central issue, the invention of
culture as a collective means of accumulating experience and custom," and this was the
"birth of the actor, the tribe, and the gesture." 298 The stage of mimesis is the "result of
evolving better conscious control over action." 299 Donald states, "In its purest form, it is
epitomized by four uniquely human abilities: mime, imitation, skill, and gesture ... , [and
the] most basic form of mimetic action is mime, the imaginative reenactment of an
event." 300 Donald tells us that they are "direct offshoots of the human executive brain
system and the Executive Suite."30 1
The second transition to mythic culture was made by the early humans, peaking in

homo sapiens about half a million years ago until today. 302 This transition was made
possible by language. Donald writes that "the scattered, concrete repertoire of mimetic
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culture came under the governance of narrative thought and ultimately, integrative
myth." 303 This stage preceded the appearance of modern homo sapiens. This stage is where
"we gain new powers and can trade, amplify, and crystallize thoughts, remember with
greater clarity, share memory, and enjoy membership in an enduring cognitive entity that
transcends the individual."304
The third transition is where we can truly speak of how the human person has
emerged into something essentially higher in new and surprising ways. Donald tells us that
the third transition can account for "astonishing changes that have taken place more
recently," and "these changes revolve around one central trend that has dominated the
history of the past 20 000 years: the externalisation of memory." 305 In the past, people had
to depend on their "natural or biological memory capacity." 306 That is not so today. There
are many factors that account for the emergence of the human person. For example, the
human brain has grown in its plasticity, especially "in the way it carries out its cognitive
business, individually and in groups, that the core configuration of skills that defines a
mind actually varies significantly as a function of different kinds of culture. " 307 The cultural
factors that shape the human person give him or her literacy skills, and the ability for
literacy changes the development of the brain. Donald asks us to consider what education
does for the person. Please see Donald's diagram in Table 3 below.
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Table 3. Bare outline of the literacy brain.
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Source: Donald, A Mind So Rare, 303.

This diagram shows a bare outline of the literacy brain, which includes several
immensely complex neuronal networks that must be wired together and interwoven
with the rest of the cognitive system when a brain learns to read and write. Since
literacy skills are usually piggy-backed onto the speech system, the speech brain is
also outlined in the figure, in a parallel column (left side) that traces the path of a
spoken word as the brain processes it. The shaded boxes and thick black arrows
highlight the special networks for written language. These must be added to the
brain's basic network architecture when we learn to read or write. They include a
reading vocabulary and a separate writing vocabulary, which does not always
correspond to the reading one (this is usually the case in second languages).
Reading and writing entail semi-independent networks .... 308
According to Donald, "symbolic technology has changed the way we think,
remember, and experience reality, individually and as a collectivity." 309 Symbolic capacity,
according to Donald's basic outline, has expanded the way one can experience the world
and expand one's consciousness. Skills in literacy run parallel to the verbal symbolic
capacity. Literacy opens up another dimension of living and enriches the horizons of a
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person. Being able to store memory externally reshapes the way that we, as persons, think,
speak, and perceive.
The paradigm Donald offers on the expanding consciousness of the human person
as a result of his or her symbolic capacity developed through culture also shows what it
means to be in the process of becoming something essentially higher. In this case, the
process of active self-transcendence continues in a trajectory of orderly complexity at the
lower level that makes up the brain, which allows for the expansion of awareness and
consciousness of the human person possessing a 'self'.
Donald continues his argument by stating that "the external memory field creates a
mirror world of consciousness" that "reflects the architecture of biological memory back
into the symbolic environment, and this mirror image is then reflected back into the
brain." 310 What happens then is that the core-consciousness of the human person stands in
the middle "between two systems of representation, one stored inside the head and the other
outside."311

The external memory "fundamentally changes the architecture of

consciousness." 312 Donald demonstrates this by presenting two diagrams. Table 4 shows
the memory system stored inside the head and Table 5 shows the memory system stored
both inside and outside the head. They are placed side by side for comparison.
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Table 4. Memory stored inside the
head.

Table 5. Memory stored inside and
outside the head.

LONG-TERM
MEMORY

LONG -TERM
MEMOm

LEVEL·3
WORKING
MEMORY

LEVEL·3
WORKING
MEMORY

I

VIVID

CONSCIOUS

CORE

I

I

VIVID

CONSCIOUS

CORE

I

EXTERNAL
MEMORY
FIELD

.... ······· ······· ....

Source: Table 4, Donald, A Mind So Rare,
310. Table 5, Donald, A Mind So Rare,
311.

PERMANENT EXTERNAL
SYMBOLIC STORAGE

The "vivid conscious core" in the diagram is where the 'self-as-subject-and-knower' is
present. Table 4 shows how we rely on our internal memory, which is limited, and how
relying too heavily on our natural or biological memory limits us in our development.
However, Table 5 shows that when we plug-in or connect ourselves to a powerful symbolic
device, such as a book or the Internet, our operational mental architecture expands vastly.
Our awareness as persons in this day and age always stands "between two simultaneously
present storage systems, one internal and biological, the other external and technological ,
each with long-term and short-term aspects." 313 Thus, driven by the creative driver that is
our vivid conscious core, we can choose how we like to direct our awareness and develop
better ways of thinking.
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5. Memory of the Future

Fuster's study of the human brain is relevant to Donald's research. Donald tells us
that the human level of awareness is different because the 'self-conscious' actor exists and
because the human person is able to regulate his or her thoughts in immediate-and-longerterm governance. This was due to the expansions of the prefrontal cortex and the newcerebellum in the brain system. 314 Fuster tells us that the prefrontal cortex region plays an
important part in the higher functions of the brain. The clinical neurological literature uses
terms such as the "'supervisory system,' 'prioritizing function,' 'hierarchy formation,' and
' working memory management"'.315 Fuster describes the general function of the prefrontal
cortex as "the temporal organization of goal-directed in the domains of behavior,
reasoning, and language."3 16 The pre-frontal cortex region has these five capacities: (1)
integration of behavior over time, (2) establishment and manipulation of information in
working memory, (3) maintenance of attention, (4) preparation for action, and (5)
inhibitory control of behavior. 317
Importantly, Fuster tells us that the human brain retains something of its past. It is
what Donald describes as vestigial brains, through which "we have inherited a deep mental
structure that is a direct reflection of the evolutionary history of our species."3 18 According
to Fuster, the human brain cannot predict evolution, but it can predict the "consequences
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of its action, with them to predict and shape further actions in a continuous cycle, the
perception/action (PA) cycle, which functionally links the organism to its environment." 31 9
The PA cycle in the human person occurs in our prefrontal cortex. The prefrontal cortex
"is the highest structure in that cycle, which integrates the past with the future - however
near or distant either is - in the course of behavior, language, and reasoning. " 320
There are three points that are important for the consideration of emergence. First,
"the PA cycle also has deep roots in evolution."321 Second, "the human brain, which
sustains the PA cycle with the cortex, is the most complex adaptive system in the universe.
It is an open system like all living systems." 322 This is why the human brain is "permanently
in quasi-equilibrium but also in constant exchange with its environment to maintain that
equilibrium." 323 Finally, it is due to the "prefrontal cortex inserted in the PA cycle, the
human brain, unlike any other, develops a prospective temporal dimension." 324 This ability
allows the human brain to make "advanced long-term adaptive changes in its
environment." 325 Fuster also adds that " language endows the human brain with the ability
to record those changes, to codify them, and to institutionalize them." 326
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The ability to prepare for future events is what Fuster calls "memory of the
future." 327 The term 'future memory' seems odd when we consider that "there is no planned
or future action without the memory, by association, of similar action in the past, by us or
by others." 328 However, "planning and decision-making consist in recreating old actions in
new fashion. " 329 Planning for future actions means "devising new PA cycles with old
cognits." 330 As Fuster explains, "By doing this, the prefrontal cortex makes of the human
brain a predictive organ, predictive of its own actions and of their consequences." 33 1 He
adds, "Insofar as the ability to decide, to plan, and to create new PA cycles is at the core of
choosing between alternative courses of action, the prefrontal cortex makes the human
brain free to act. " 332
Fuster' s framework on the brain's predictive ability also includes drawing from
resources outside a person, namely, according to Donald, culture. Future memory does not
only refer to immediate planning, such as what to eat for lunch tomorrow. This ability is
also related to the process of seeking reward, usually for the good and well-being of the
person. We can plug in and draw deeply from the external memories within our grasp and
then find ourselves before a wide and an almost endless horizon. It can give the person a
sense of freedom and newness. Consider the diagram presented by Fuster in Table 6. Fuster
speaks of the convergence of all active forms of memory before making a decision.
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Table 6. Fuster's presentation of PA from the past, present and to the future

Source: Fuster, The Neuroscience ofFreedom, figure 5.1.
The two cones of decision-making, the perceptual (P) converging on the present,
the executive (A) diverging from it into the future. The converging influences
originate in a multitude of cortical cognits representing all active forms of memory,
in addition to the subcortical biological drives weighing on a decision. The decision
is a resultant - chosen - executive vector of action among the many possible
alternatives of action and 'affordance'. 333

6. Cultural Scaffolding
The idea of scaffolding affirms the work of Donald and Fuster. Donald writes that
the external memory field, which gives us sharper and more durable mental
representations, allows the conscious mind to reflect on thought itself and to evolve longer,
more abstract, procedures that serve to verify and control the quality of its own actions. 334
That "results in a scaffolded cultural process that can accumulate and improve over
time." 335 Warren S. Brown argues that cultural scaffolding is a quality of human
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distinctiveness. Brown, who references Andy Clark's book Being There, states that some
of the most important aspects of human intelligence are not within the brain or body at all
but in "external scaffolding," which is the emergence of the highest form of human mental
processing.336 Clark states, "We use intelligence to structure our environment so that we
can succeed with less intelligence. Our brains make the world smart so that we can be dumb
in peace! ... It is the human brain plus these chunks of external scaffolding that finally
constitutes the smart, rational inference engine we call mind." 33 7
Donald tells us that the emergence of the human ability for symbolic computing
was the great divide. It is not symbolic computing in itself that is important; it is the forward
trajectory of expansion and becoming something essentially higher. It is a way for human
beings to flourish in the world. Brown states that "some of the most important elements of
human mental capacities arise from that which the long cultural history of the human race
has built into our environments to augment our cognitive processes. " 338 Our social
embeddedness in a "social and cultural context serves not only to influence the selfassembly and continual reorganization of our bodily neurocognitive systems, but it also
offloads much of the cognitive work that allows us to act intelligently and creatively and
to flourish as persons and as societies." 339 It is interesting that Brown points out that we
become intelligent "by learning to use ' tools' that we did not have to invent." 340 It is by
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this that "we could also reasonably argue that human social intelligence---our deep
sociality-is scaffolded by cultural systems within which we learn to negotiate the social
world: families, nurseries, schools, universities, clubs, businesses, governments, etc." 341
Thus, "our process of self-assembly in becoming uniquely human is a matter ofleaming to
marshal the benefits of interpersonal and social systems that we do not need to invent."342
To summarize this section, the aspect of the human person is enriched when one's
understanding is drawn from patterns across levels of emergence and across scientific
theories. For example, Donald ' s work presented a trajectory of the gradual series of a
hominid's evolutionary changes, from Miocene apes to modem humans. 343 He states that
his model is the "outcome of a cross-disciplinary project" and was "constructed from 'big
facts'; that is, the most enduring, and relatively stable, knowledge emanating from such
fields as cognitive science, evolutionary biology, developmental psychology, comparative
neuroanatomy, paleontology, archaeology, psycholinguistics, and anthropology." 344
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PartC

7. Conclusion: Definition and Clarifications
It is difficult to define emergence with a degree of certainty. Goodenough and

Deacon state that emergence not only surrounds us in the non-living world, but it is also
the key dynamic ofliving organisms. This description reminds me of the description of the
living 'force' in the Star Wars franchise. The definition I offer would place me in the same
camp as Clayton and Gregersen.
My working definition of emergence is as follows: emergence is a scientific

perspective by which we integrate the evolutionary perspective to describe how something,
due to an increase in complexity, can emerge from the lower to become something
essentially higher, often in new ways that are unpredictable, irreducible, novel, and
surprising.
Two points of clarifications are necessary. These clarifications were raised by
Clayton on the doubts one may have on emergence. First, it concerns the disparity between
science and philosophy. Clayton writes that "philosophy requires theories that are unified,
consistent, and as conceptually exact as possible, theories that can be applied without
ambiguity across a wide variety of fields." 345 Yet, "the theoretical contexts are so radically
different for any two cases of emergent phenomena in the natural world," such as between
"the emergence of the classical physical world from quantum mechanical states."346
Clayton also points out that there is no such thing as "a science of emergence."347 However,
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Clayton notes that "what the scientific theories describe are, at least in some cases,
emergent phenomena. But this observation is meta-scientific or philosophical rather than
directly scientific." 348
The example I presented was guided by my own philosophical enquiry and my
study of the patterns across scientific theories. There are commonalities in the work of
Donald and Fuster. Clayton points out that this method might not seem attractive to those
who want a more rigorous theory. His point is that "emergence is disanalogous, since a
theory in this field will not be successful unless it is derived from more than one scientific
discipline." 349 Since emergence is considered a perspective and not a theory of science, it
is "an overarching concept that must pertain to theoretical structures and results in multiple
fields. As a consequence, it cannot draw too heavily on the details of theories in any
particular discipline." 350
In the next chapter, I will argue that this scientific perspective of emergence is
congruent with and can enrich Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence.
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Chapter 3
Active Self-Transcendence and the Scientific Perspective of Emergence

I maintain m this thesis that the scientific perspective of emergence can add
robustness to Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence. In this chapter, I will argue that
both positions inherently share a common premise and that the characteristics that define
emergence are also present in active self-transcendence in such ways that active selftranscendence can incorporate the characteristics of emergence in its description of how
matter can increase in complexity until it becomes something essentially higher.
As was mentioned in the first chapter, Rahner has been part of the dialogue between
theology and science even before the Second Vatican Council. He grappled with the
scientific perspective of the universe, as evidenced in his writings. In "Natural Science and
Reasonable Faith," he tries to "forge a link between theology and the basic concepts of an
evolutionary 'world view"' and on "the question of the evolution ofliving beings and the
idea of a universal evolutionary development of the cosmos."351 The notion of active selftranscendence is integrated in the evolutionary view of the world.
There are more similarities than dissimilarities between active self-transcendence
and emergence. Davies invites his readers to move toward an emergentist worldview. He
stated earlier that the universe started out in a simple, almost totally featureless state, but
the complexity, diversity, and richness on all scales of size have emerged since the Big
Bang in a long sequence of physical processes.352 He writes that "scientists would like to
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understand the nature and origin of this complexity."353 I could add that the rest ofus would
also like to understand, but I do not know if that is necessarily true. What is true is that the
scientific perspective of emergence has enabled those who are interested in understanding
to have some limited grasp of the complexity required to give rise to something that has
emerged from an essentially lower level. Thus, while we say that the notion of active selftranscendence was developed with an evolutionary view in mind, the same can be said of
the "emergence theory [that] was formed in the safe context of the Darwinian revolution
in science." 354

1. Putting It Together

Rahner presents his view on how nature develops through his notion of active selftranscendence. I refer to emergence as a scientific perspective in this thesis, and I think it
is important to flesh out the difference between a perspective and a notion. Perspective is
synonymous with viewpoint, standpoint, or outlook. Clayton believes that emergence is a
philosophical position, and I agree with him. However, I prefer to use the term 'scientific
perspective' within a specific philosophical position to describe the nature of things. 355
Though emergence is sometimes described as "emergence theory," even in this thesis, it is
not a specific theory of science like the theory of the Big Bang. 356 As such, a scientific
perspective seems to be a good description.
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Notion is synonymous with idea, concept, and perception. Rahner speaks of the
"unity of philosophy and theology" in his work, and this unity is essential for an
understanding that embodies existence and the Christian life. 357 Like emergence, Rahner' s
position is not a scientific theory. While examining theology from an evolutionary
perspective, Rahner described a philosophical position that is identical to the philosophical
position of emergence. What I mean by similar position is not to say that active selftranscendence and emergence are identical but that they share similar orientations, such as
of seeing the unity of all things and a recognition of a hierarchy between the higher and
lower in terms of complexity. This is because both positions were developed with an
evolutionary theory in mind.
In the first chapter, I defined Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence in two
parts. Active self-transcendence can be described as matter developing in a process of
becoming whereby the higher levels are orientated in terms of an ever-increasing
complexity with and through the lower levels of matter, giving rise to something
substantially new, a leap into something essentially higher. This is made possible through
the creative power of the absolute fullness of being that is so intrinsic to the finite existent
that this finite existent is empowered to achieve a real and active self-transcendence. 358 I

presented the definition of active self-transcendence in two parts because the first part
clearly shows that Rahner has weaved an evolutionary perspective into his notion of active
self-transcendence, while the second incorporates the element of faith and explains how
there can be an increase in complexity resulting in the higher from the lower.
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Earlier, I defined emergence as follows : Emergence is a scientific perspective by

which we integrate the evolutionary perspective to describe how something, due to an
increase in complexity, can emerge from the lower to become something essentially higher,
often in new ways that are unpredictable, irreducible, novel, and surprising.359 What I
assert in this thesis is that emergence can best concretize the general principles and truth
of Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence. Furthermore, the meanings and
characteristics of emergence from a scientific perspective can also belong to the notion of
active self-transcendence. This is especially true because they both share similar
philosophical positions.
An obvious question then is, what are the characteristics in Rahner' s notion of

active self-transcendence? In the first chapter, I pointed out some of the key words that
Rahner uses in Foundations to describe the notion of active self-transcendence. The key
words can also be considered as part of the characteristics of active self-transcendence.
They include "becoming" (as in "becoming something more"), "surpassing of self,"
"intrinsic increase of its own being," and "emptiness actively achieving its own
fullness ." 360 Rahner sees that a finite existence is empowered to achieve a real and active
self-transcendence. This is possible because of the power of the absolute fullness of being
that is intrinsic in the finite existence. What is important to note now is that the notion of
self-transcendence "includes transcendence into something substantially new, a leap to
something essentially higher. " 36 1 The characteristics of active self-transcendence are
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similar to those of the characteristics of emergence, as I will argue below. 362 But first, I will
present an outline of my argument of how the scientific perspective of emergence can give
robustness to Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence in table 7.

Table 7: Outline of how emergence enriches active self-transcendence
The scientific perspective of emergence

The notion of active self-transcendence

'Scientific perspective' within a specific
philosophical position to describe the nature
of things.
(My working definition of emergence)
Emergence is a scientific perspective
by which we integrate the evolutionary
perspective to describe how something, due
to an increase in complexity, can emerge
from the lower to become something
essentially higher, often in new ways that
are unpredictable, irreducible, novel, and
surprising. (82)

Notion is synonymous with idea, concept,
and perception.
(First part of my working definition)
Active self-transcendence can be
described as matter developing in a process
of becoming whereby the higher levels are
orientated in terms of an ever-increasing
complexity with and through the lower levels
of matter, giving rise to something
substantially new, a leap into something
essentially higher. (32)

1.1. The Unity of All Things
Monism, the idea that reality is
ultimately composed of one basic kind
of stuff. (85)

1.1. The Unity of All Things
Monism, the idea that reality is ultimately
composed of one basic kind of stuff. (85)

1.2. Hierarchical Complexity: Higher and
Lower. (87-90)

1.2. Hierarchical Complexity: Higher and
Lower. (87-90)
Rahner uses the term 'higher' and
'lower', including the term 'complexity'
to characterize a process of active selftranscendence. I also pointed out the
inclusiveness ofRahner's notion where in
Foundations, he described active selftranscendence as the "transcendence into
something substantially new, a leap to
something essentially higher. " 363

1.3. No Monolithic Law (90)

1.3. No Monolithic Law (90)

1.4. Patterns Across Levels of Emergence
(90-91)

I .4. Patterns Across Levels of Emergence (9091)
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1.1. The Unity of All Things
Monism, the idea that reality is ultimately composed of one basic kind of stuff, is
important to the concept of emergence. This idea becomes relevant when the explanations
of physics are not sufficient to explain what exists. There are a variety of ways in which
this idea can be expressed. First, Clayton follows theologian and biochemist Arthur
Peacocke and speaks on the idea of "emergentist monism." According to Clayton, "this
process of hierarchical structuring [that] takes place over time: Darwinian evolution (and
some forms of cosmological evolution) move from simple to the more complex." 364
Another is a means to address the concerns about Descartes's body-mind dualism. Clayton
speaks of "emergentist dualism," which "asserts that really distinct levels occur within the
one natural world and that objects on various levels can be ontologically primitive (can be
entities in their own right) rather than being understood merely as aggregates of lowerlevel, foundational particles (ontological atomism)."365 As noted earlier, Gregersen states
that this description allows Clayton to have the "advantage of seeing the emergence of the
human mind as continuous with other sorts of self-reproducing systems." 366 Monism also
agrees with Morowitz's twenty-eight distinct levels of emergence, which I described in the
previous chapter. 367 However, I adhere to the idea of monism because emergence holds that
there is a point from which everything began (i.e. , the Big Bang), and emergence accounts
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for plurality in its hierarchy of systems. The essential idea is that the natural world is one
and continuous, not disparate or dualistic.
The position of monism can strengthen Rahner's position on the unity of all things,
even if that unity originates from a divine being. Consider Rahner's concept of the intrinsic
unity of spirit and matter in the human person. 368 It is a position similar to that of monism,
which maintains that the universe is ultimately composed of one basic kind of stuff. When
Clayton uses the term "emergentist pluralism," it allows him to synthesize the unity of the
body with the emergence of the mind. Rahner, as I pointed out in chapter one, states that
the "Christian professes in his faith that all things, heaven and earth, the realm of the
material and of the spiritual, are the creation of one and the same God." 369 If everything in
the universe originates from God, then this means that all things in their variety "proceed
from one cause." 370
According to Rahner, "It also means that this variety manifests an inner similarity
and commonality, and that this variety or differentiation forms a unity in its origin, its selfrealization and its determination - that is, it forms a single world." 37 1 This framework
allows Rahner to claim that the human person is a part of the matter of creation that has
become conscious. Spirit and matter are "mutually related and inseparable elements of the
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single person," they are not "reducible to each other. " 372 Rahner sees the unity of all things
and notes that "it is the intrinsic nature of matter to develop towards spirit." 373

1.2. Hierarchical Complexity: Higher and Lower
Hierarchical complexity is a point that was highlighted at the end of chapter one. It
relates to the point Rahner makes about active self-transcendence, which is similar to the
perspective of emergence, and it pertains to complexity. Rahner uses the terms 'higher'
and 'lower' , including the term ' complexity', to characterize a process of active selftranscendence. In the first chapter, we saw Rahner relating active self-transcendence to the
development of biologically organized materiality, which is orientated in terms of an everincreasing complexity.374 I also pointed out the inclusiveness of Rahner' s notion where, in

Foundations, he described active self-transcendence as the "transcendence into something
substantially new, a leap to something essentially higher. " 375
This notion of a hierarchy of levels, systems, or complexity agrees with Rahner's
position about a growing complexity of matter that transforms into something substantially
new, that leaps to something essentially higher. This is also related to the perspective of
strong or ontological emergence. Additionally, the idea is apparent in Gregersen's
description of Emergence 4 , in Clayton' s description of emergentist pluralism, and, of
course, in the Hierarchical Complexity, which this thesis presents as a keystone in the
perspective of emergence.
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In table 8 below, Peacocke presents a classic perspective on the lower and the
higher and on the hierarchy of disciplines (complexity). Vertically, Peacocke's series
ranges from the physical to the cultural and includes the biological and the behavioral.
Horizontally, Peacocke lists each emergent phenomenon at its respective level: everything
in the physical world is constituted of matter-energy in space-time, the behavior of living
organism is the focus of behavioral sciences, and so forth.
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Peacocke states that level 4 is meant only to indicate some of the aspects of human culture,
while in levels 1 to 3, he gives examples of the systems that correspond with their scientific
disciplines. In level 2, he elaborates on the part-whole hierarchy of levels of organization
within the nervous system. 376 Theologian and physicist Robert Russell states that the
vertical axis, which describes increasing complexity, makes two claims: "l) lower levels
place constraints on upper levels (against ' two worlds' treatments that make them
autonomous), but 2) upper levels are emergent and cannot be reduced entirely to lower
levels (against 'epistemic reductionism' that evacuates upper levels of novel claims about
the world)." 377 For example, "physics places constraints on biology: no acceptable
biological theory can contradict relativity or quantum mechanics." 378 Russell adds that "at
the same time no theory in biology can be reduced entirely to theories such as relativity or
quantum mechanics in physics. Instead some of the processes, properties, and laws of the
upper level are emergent in nature." 379
Russell emphasizes that the horizontal axis of the diagram is unique to Peacocke' s
insight. Peacocke ranks the "natural phenomena in terms of their increasing size within the
same epistemic level. Thus physical systems at the bottom of the diagram range from
elementary particles to galaxies."380 Peacocke' s diagram is but one visual demonstration of
the degree of emergence from the lower to the higher, and it reasserts the perspective of
monism in emergence. Peacocke's diagram on the hierarchical complexity strengthens
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Rahner's notion about the essential unity of all things and about the increase in complexity
that results in something that is substantially new, something the leaps to a higher nature.

1.3. No Monolithic Law
If we accept both active self-transcendence and emergence as a philosophical

position, then there should not be a monolithic law for both viewpoints. This will allow one
to explore and discern patterns in the transitions between sciences. The hierarchical levels
and Morowitz's work give us a sense of the broadness of the universe. Rahner's goal in his
notion was to say how something can increase in complexity and how this increase gives
rise to something new. This notion is not meant to be confined within a specific scientific
theory. The essential point of Rahner's notion is to state that it is the creative dynamic
power of the absolute being that makes active self-transcendence possible. To rephrase
Clayton's statement on this earlier, that which can constitute the process of active selftranscendence within the scientific perspective of emergence should be viewed as a term
of family resemblance. 381

1.4. Patterns across Levels of Emergence
Understanding patterns across levels of emergence can help one to grasp how
something can emerge, develop, or leap into something essentially higher. The patterns can
also show more concretely the common traits that are to be found in the evolution of matter
and of living and spiritual beings. In the second part of chapter two, I demonstrated how
studying the patterns across levels of emergence can enrich what one can understand about
what constitutes the human person. The relationship and interaction of the human being
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with the forces outside of him or herself resulted in language, literacy, culture, diversity,
and openness. This is close also to the classic example of Campbell's downward causation,
as it manifests a characteristic of downward causation, namely, that we are shaped by our
environrnent. 382 Deacon offers more on this with his view on self-organization, autocatalyst, and autopoiesis. 383
Rabner says that it will be ideal if we can show more concretely what common
traits are to be found in the evolution of material, living, and spiritual beings towards a
higher dimension oflife. 384 Integrating patterns across levels of emergence can achieve this.
For me, understanding the patterns across levels of emergence include integrating different
scientific theories. For example, one branch of science cannot do justice to the
understanding and implications of Peacocke' s hierarchical complexity which we have seen
earlier. It is only by understanding the patterns across levels of emergence with its different
scientific theories that we can have an enriched understanding of the universe we live in
and the amazing condition present from the beginning of time that gave rise to life and to
the conscious human person.

2. Clarifications

I have endeavored to show that the perspective of emergence is broad. Can the same
be said about the notion of active self-transcendence? I believe the answer is yes. Oliver
Putz, a professor ofreligious studies, offered a critique on Rahner' s argument about matter

382

Refer to pages 62-63 .

383

Terrence Deacon, Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter (New York: W .W .
Norton, 2013).
384

Rahner, "Christology Within Evolutionary View," 168.

91

developing into life and, subsequently, into the human person. 385 Response to this critique
helps to clarify the broadness of Rahner's argument.
Putz writes, "Rahner argues for a direction of evolution that leads inevitably to
human beings, and he further insists that the natural sciences would have to agree." 386 Putz
seems to be over-reading Rahner. While Rahner does say that "there is no reason to deny
that matter should have developed towards life and towards man," it does not seem that
Rahner is 'insisting. ' 387 Furthermore, Putz states, "Rahner's line of reasoning resembles an
ontological proof in that it simply presupposes that nature comes to itself in the human
being, in which case Rahner is quite correct: the presence of man cannot be chance, but
only fulfillment of the teleological process of evolution." 388 He adds, "There is no reason
to accept the assumption. " 389 According to Putz, "what Rahner has demonstrated
convincingly is that what is required for nature to come to itself is a conscious creature. As
we have seen, there are more conscious species than man, and so his conclusion seems not
to hold up." 390 Rahner does not seem to be making an argument resembling an ontological
proof like what we would see in the work of Thomas Aquinas, though it could be argued
that his work follows the pattern of Aquinas. There is certainly a logical reasoning to how
Rahner argues his point. Rahner was explaining how the human person arrives at
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consc10usness through the process of active self-transcendence by integrating an
evolutionary perspective. Nowhere in his writings does Rahner dismiss consciousness in
other creatures. In fact, Rahner's essay in Theological Investigations proves that he does
consider the evolution of all other creatures. He says that he was "presupposing the extreme
in evolution as a given or as a hypothetical assumption of the natural scientist, and we are
asking only whether something of this sort must be rejected by theology or not (The
emergence of the human being will receive special consideration later)." 39 1 And he asks,
Is a continuous development of the cosmos from its simplest and most original
components right up to its present differentiation and complexity, the realm of
living being included, acceptable to Christian faith in such a way that it can leave
this whole evolution to natural science as a thesis or hypothesis, and then, at most,
afterwards include this evolution in a Christian conception of the world? 392
Rahner answers 'yes' to his own question and presents a framework of active selftranscendence, and he specifically states that he is not yet considering the human person in
that section of his argument. He writes,
Our answer is yes .... Each in its own stage can become something else, can change
and become "more" ("higher"), whereby this "more" can of course be quite
different, cannot, however, be excluded in the development in favor of simply
"being different," regardless of whether such a being different would really contain
fewer metaphysical questions than a "being more." 393
Rahner does consider the evolutionary leap "of development to animal consciousness," and
he thinks that it is a "sufficiently elevated organization of matter." 394 Despite the sensitivity
of the debate on the compatibility of the teachings of evolution and the Christian
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conception of the world, Rahner still applies the notion of active self-transcendence to all
creation, including animals. 395
While I have argued that the scientific perspective of emergence can add robustness
to Rahner's notion, it should be obvious that there is one major difference between the two:
the scientific perspective of emergence stops at the level of science, while Rahner attributes
active self-transcendence or emergence to the dynamic power of the absolute being we call
God. It is the power of the absolute that causes matter to actively self-transcend. For
Rahner, this is possible because God has been immanently present in creation. It is what
he states that Christian theology formerly calls 'conservatio' and 'concursus'. 396

4. Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that the scientific perspective of emergence can add
robustness to Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence. I demonstrated how the
meanings and characteristics of emergence can strengthen Rahner's notion. I also showed
that both positions share an inherent commonality and that the characteristics that define
emergence are also present in active self-transcendence. I also touched on monism,
hierarchical complexity, no monolithic law, and patterns across levels of emergence.
Additionally, in order to demonstrate the broadness of Rahner's argument, I responded to
a critique put forth by Putz.
The final point I wish to make is that Rahn er was limited by the science of his time.
He was working with the discoveries of science that was about fifty years old. Although
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we now know far more about the human person, Rahner's notion of active selftranscendence stills holds, and it helps us to understand divine action within an
evolutionary perspective. Rahner's notion is still relevant and is made even richer and more
robust by the scientific perspective of emergence.
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Conclusion
A Step Further: On Sacred Ground

We have explored how the scientific perspective of emergence can enrich Rahner's
notion of active self-transcendence. The question of what this means and its implication
seems to be the next logical step. Other than contributing to the relationship between
theology and science, this thesis can also relate to how we can respond to God and to the
world we live in today.
In the first chapter, I showed how Rahner states that the human person faced
themselves as a question. In facing themselves as a question, human persons are already
quodamodo omia (in a certain way everything). The Book of Exodus tells us that God's

name is "YHWH," which means, "I-AM-WHO-AM" (Exodus 3:14). It tells us that God
simply 'is'. I agree with Rahner that human persons face themselves as a question. The
question "I AM?" is deeply felt in one's being. These questions which never cease are the
grounds of one's transcendence into the horizon of mystery. The person who is faced with
the question of "I AM?" reaches out to the absolute being who simply 'is'. There is an
openness in one's orientation which Rahner calls the pre-apprehension (Vorgrif.f) of being.
One stretches out beyond oneself into one's horizon, but the horizon recedes further and
further the more answers one discovers. If this can be considered as a continual increase of
one's being, then the process of becoming is still ongoing. In my view, Rahner integrated
an evolutionary perspective into a dynamism that is still ongoing in creation.
Part A of the first chapter explained what emergence entailed while part B showed
an aspect of how we can conceive this on-going process of becoming. Part B demonstrated
that integrating theories across various scientific disciplines can tell us how something, due
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to an increase in complexity, can emerge from the lower to become something essentially
higher, often in new ways that are unpredictable, irreducible, novel, and surprising. The
starting point of emergence is similar to a point made by Rahner. The scientific perspective
of emergence is fueled by human persons facing themselves as a question. In this respect,
the reductionist perspective is just too poor an answer for the question of "I AM?" and why
there is 'something' in the universe instead of 'nothing'. It is what Hawking and Mlodinow
state in the first chapter of their book, "To understand the universe at the deepest level, we
need to know not only how the universe behaves, but why. Why is there something rather
than nothing? Why do we exist? Why this particular set of laws and not some other?" 397
What can both active self-transcendence and emergence mean for us as human
persons? Clayton points out that the logical conclusion to the trajectory of emergence of
the human person is freedom and self-transcendence. He states, "We have found that the
pattern of emergence points toward continuously new forms of complexity and causality;
it is the nature of the evolutionary process to be continually self-transcending toward ever
new forms of novelty."398 He argues that the "more complex the life form, the more
openness it reveals and the more it transcends its immediate environment."399 "Homo
sapiens," Clayton claims, "with its ability to create inner models of imaginary worlds
radically different from the actual one, is undeniably the most radically self-transcending
species to date. " 400
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There is then a dynamism or an internal movement that is happening within one's
mental processes that affects one's being. It is not a stretch then to consider that having
faith as a believer opens the horizons of one's life. For example, faith can contribute to the
quality of one's marriage and family life. Imagine a faith that is related or integrated with
a scientific perspective of emergence. Applying the eyes of faith as a believer of the
absolute presence on the idea of 'becoming' and that the human person is forever in the
process of self-expanding tells us that we are part of a divine creative movement even if
we cannot fully grasp what that is. Borrowing a phrase by Rabner, there is a sense that we
are grasped by the mystery of the divine.
Rabner tells us that "from the outset God is lovingly seeking in freedom to bestow
himself and, because he so wills in freedom, because he wills grace, he must create a
'nature' to which he can impart himself as free love."40 1 Thus, "nature is, because grace
has to be."402 In other words, we 'are' because grace has to 'be' . The creative power of
God is already intrinsic in creation, in all life, in culture, and in every human person. We
are all made of the same stuff of creation and have become aware and achieved
consciousness. Grace is something present in all creation and at the heart of all existence.
All conscious creatures can now recognize and accept God's offer of love, but the
difference is in our 'acceptance' and our 'belief. Rabner tells us that the purpose of
creation is to be divinized, and Christ, who entered the evolutionary process, was the first
to accept this offer of love.403 The way is now open to us. Freedom is in our decision on
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whether or not to participate as an autonomous and "responsible person(s) in relation to the
environment. " 404
I can see how Rahner can claim that the basic and ultimate thrust of Christian life
is not from the fact that being Christian is a special instance of humankind but that "a
Christian is simply man as he is." 405 Rahner tells us that "the real and total and
comprehensive task of a Christian is to be a human being, a human being of course whose
depth are divine." 406 I cannot help but think that Rahner's evolutionary view of the world
shaped his understanding and also gave some shape to his theology. From my perspective,
there is some 'grounded-ness' to his writings that is intelligible and which resonates with
the realities of life.
One notable point in Rahner' s notion of active self-transcendence and the scientific
perspective of emergence is that there is a sense of kinship that we all emerged from the
same place, namely, God. This dimension can speak to how we can respond as responsible
persons. Theologian Elizabeth A. Johnson expresses this idea when talking about "the
community of creation" paradigm in her work Ask the Beasts: Darwin and the God of

Love. 407 Her paradigm revisits and abandons the model of dominion found in the first
chapter of the Book of Genesis. She writes, "In a felicitous development, biblical scholars
in our day have discovered that the paradigm of dominion is not the only nor even the main
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view proposed by the Bible." 408 She states that "more common is the paradigm of the
community of creation, based on the understanding that humans and other living beings,
for all their differences, form one community woven together by the common thread of
having been created by God." 409 The community model emphasizes "our theological
human identity as created, our biological embeddedness in the natural world, and our
reciprocal interdependence with other species and the life-giving systems that support us
all."410 Johnson argues that our responsibility as human persons is "best understood as
stewardship and responsible care," and this is "one among many important exchanges we
have with the natural world."411 She tells us that "human responsibility is exercised within
creation, in relation to other fellow creatures who are created as we are, and upon whom
we depend for our own lives. As a role among creatures, it is shepherding for which we are
ultimately responsible to God." 412
I started this project with a pastoral concern in mind, which is that our practice of
faith can be intelligible with the realities of life, the processes of nature, and with the
discoveries of science. However, working on this thesis has also given me a greater
appreciation of the sacredness of all life and of the miracle that creates the condition for
the emergence of human life, which calls for a response. In the encyclical Laudato Si ', the
Pope tells us that our uniqueness demands that we take responsibility for our neighbor and
for our common home. Besides helping to improve the quality of life for all humans, we
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must address the problems that threaten our common home such as air and water pollution,
climate change, environmental degradation, and the loss of biodiversity. He writes, "If the
simple fact of being human moves people to care for the environment of which they are a
part, Christians in their tum 'realize that their responsibility within creation, and their duty
towards nature and the Creator, are an essential part of their faith."' 413

Epilogue

The universe is an open question, a place of deep mystery. There can only be
questions because there is someone to ask; there can only be mystery because there is
someone to ponder it. We human beings are knowers: we know that we know, we also
know that we do not know, though some may argue that most people do not know that they
do not know. When I read Rahner last year, he made a point that struck me to my core. Our
questions drive us, open our horizons, and they are the ground from which we transcend
into the mystery of God. This led me to examine Rahner's notion of active selftranscendence within the scientific perspective of emergence.
Active self-transcendence as I saw it is as follows: Active self-transcendence can
be described as matter developing in a process of becoming whereby the higher levels are
orientated in terms of an ever-increasing complexity with and through the lower levels of
matter, giving rise to something substantially new, a leap into something essentially higher.
This is made possible through the creative power of the absolute fullness of being that is
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so intrinsic to the finite existent that this finite existent is empowered to achieve a real and
active self-transcendence. 414

I was amazed at how close the discussion of emergence is to Rahner's notion. My
own working definition of emergence is as follows: Emergence is a scientific perspective
by which we integrate the evolutionary perspective to describe how something, due to an
increase in complexity, can emerge from the lower to become something essentially higher,
often in new ways that are unpredictable, irreducible, novel, and surprising. 415

I hope that my thesis raises more questions than it answers. I intend to continue
studying the openness of the human person. I want to know more about brain science that
tries to explain this wide horizontal dimension and its implications for theology. There are
also, for me, more practical questions, such as those about grace, sacraments, and about
how God acts. In the meantime, Rahner's notion of active self-transcendence can fill one
with hope and give one a positive outlook for the present and for the future.
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